IGAD SECURITY SECTOR PROGRAM (IGAD SSP)

ASSESSMENT REPORT OFTRENDS AND DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST NETWORKS, SUCH AS DA'ESH,

IN THE IGAD REGION

Assessment of Trends and Dynamics of International Terrorist Networks, such as Da'esh, in the IGAD Region

IGAD SECURITY SECTOR PROGRAM (IGAD SSP)

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

Updated: January 2020
Note: Compiled by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, this graphic shows violent events involving the listed groups over the 12-month period ending December 31, 2019. Data on attacks or fatalities does not attempt to distinguish the perpetrators of the events. Group listings are intended for informational purposes only and should not be considered official designations. Due to the fluid nature of many groups, the listed affiliations may change.
Sources: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED); Daniel Byman; Thomas Joscelyn; SITE Intelligence Group; The Soufan Group; Stanford University's Mapping Militants Project; Stratfor; Terrorism Research & Analysis Consortium (TRAC); and Aaron Y. Zelin.

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ADA	Austrian Development Agency
ACLED	Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
ACOTAP	Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance program
ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
AfDB	African Development Bank
AFRICOM	United States African Command
AIAI	Al Itihaad al Islamiya
Al-Shabaab	Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AMLR	Anti-Money Laundering Regulations
AML/CFT	Anti-Money laundering/ Countering Financing of Terrorism
AMYC	Anzaar Muslim Youth Centre
APS	Administrative Police Service
AQAP	Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
AQIM	Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ARS	Alliance for the Reliberation of Somalia
ATA	Anti-Terrorism Assistance
ATPU	Anti-Terrorism Police Unit
AU	African Union
BDU	Bomb Disposal Unit
BOS	Bank of Sudan
CAP	County Action Plans
CAR	Central African Republic
CT	Counter-Terrorism
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States

CFIU	Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit
CFR	Council on Foreign Relations
C-IED	Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)
CJTF-HOA	Combined Joint-Task Force in the Horn of Africa
CLTG	Civilian-Led Transitional Government
C-SSAVE	Child Safety and Security Against Violent Extremists
CTED	Counter Terrorism Executive Directorate
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DCI	Directorate of Criminal Investigation
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EA	East Africa
ECCAS	Economic Commission of Central African States
EU	European Union
FGS	Federal Government of Somalia
FIS	Islamic Salvation Front
FMS	Federal Member States of Somalia
FRC	Financial Reporting Center
G5 Sahel	Group of Five (Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger)
GAI	El-Gamaa al-Islamiyya
GCERF	Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GN	Gendarmerie Nationale
GNA	Government of National Salvation
GSPC	Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat
GSU	General Service Unit
HOA	Horn of Africa
HPSS	Humanitarian Peace Support School

ICEPCVE	IGAD Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism
ICU	Islamic Courts Union
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IGAD	Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IJOC	Interagency Joint Operations Centre
IPK	Islamic Party of Kenya
IS	Islamic State
ISCAP	Islamic State Central Africa Province
ISIL (Da'esh)	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh, Arabic acronym)
ISWAP	Islamic State West Africa Province
JEM	Justice and Equality Movement
JNIM	Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin
KDF	Kenya Defense Forces
KPS	Kenya Police Service
LAPSSET	Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport
LNA	Libyan National Army
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MODEL	Movement for Development and Liberty
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization's Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo
MS	IGAD Member State
MYC	Muslim Youth Centre
NCC	National Consultative Council
NCP	National Congress Party
NCTC	National Counter Terrorism Centre

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NIF	National Islamic Front
NIS	National Intelligence Service
NRA	National Risk Assessment
NSA	National Security Act
NSCVE	National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism
OAU	Organisatiop of African Unity
OIC	Organisation of Islamic Cooperation
OPCW	Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PAIC	Popular Arab Islamic Conference
PFLP	Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine
PISCES	Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System
PPSHAR	Promoting Peace and Stability in the Horn of Africa Region
PRM	Pumwani's Riyadha Mosque
RBPU	Rural Border Patrol Unit
RDD	Republic of Djibouti
R-TGoNU	Revitalized Transitional Government of National Unity
SLM/A–MM	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army–Minni Minawi
SLM/A–WW	Sudan Liberation Movement/Army–Abdel Wahid
SNCCT	Sudan National Commission for Counter-Terrorism
SSP	Security Sector Program
SSPDF	South Sudan People's Defence Force
TFG	Transitional Federal Government
TIP	Trafficking In Persons
TNG	Transitional National Government
TOC	Transnational Organized Crime
TPV	Terrorism and Political Violence

TSTs	Transnational Security Threats
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UVIKITA	Tanzanian Muslim Youth Union
UN	United Nations
UNCCT	United Nations Counter Terrorism Centre
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UPDF	Uganda People's Defense Forces
USAFRICOM	United States Africa Command
WB	World Bank
VBIE	Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosives

Executive Summary

Preamble

IGAD's Peace and Security Strategy (2016-2020) prioritized preventing and countering Transnational Security Threats (TSTs) as key result areas. It acknowledged that TSTs pose a serious threat to the security, stability, and economic development of the region and hinder regional integration. One of these TSTs is the terrorist threat posed by various groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), officially known in the Arabic language acronym as Da'esh.

This study describes, explains, analyzes and assesses trends, vulnerability factors and threats of the major international terrorist organizations and networks active in the IGAD Member States, such as Da'esh. The study is conducted with the realization that typologies, patterns, modus operandi and the behavior of terrorist groups are changing, dynamic and fluid. An allied purpose of the study is to increase awareness, strengthen monitoring and reporting mechanisms in a dynamic situation of increased complexity. Hence, the study sheds light on threats posed by international terrorist networks in a situation shrouded in low-level knowledge about the nature, scope, magnitude, types, terminology and impacts of such groups in the IGAD region and its member states.

Therefore, the general objective of this study is to produce evidence-based information about major international terrorist organizations and networks in the IGAD region. Through this, it aims to contribute to the knowledge and capacity of IGAD and its Member States to craft policies and interventions aimed at preventing and countering transnational terrorism, in general, and the threat of Da'esh, in particular. Furthermore, based on the assessment findings, it seeks to develop regional and national mechanisms to prevent and counter

threats posed by Da'esh. Consistent with the overall objective, the study provides, below, a country-by-country synoptic overview of the international terrorists' present threats, followed by an IGAD-wide assessment based on country studies.

Synoptic Country Reviews

IGAD is comprised of its constituent members, the building blocks of the organization and the main domain in which its operations occur. Therefore, it is important to provide brief country synopses before delving into assessments of the cross-country dynamics, detailing Da'esh's overall presence, behavior and strategy in the IGAD Member States:

Djibouti: Djibouti is an important hub for counterterrorism in the Horn of Africa and piracy in the Indian Ocean. It also has the largest concentration of foreign military bases of any African country. It remains least affected by extremist Islamist terrorists such as Da'esh, despite its proximity to countries in which these groups are active, such as neighbouring Somalia and Yemen, across the Red Sea. Among the commonly known incentives for youth recruitment and radicalization by extremist terrorist groups, are extreme poverty and high levels of youth unemployment.

Ethiopia: Since 2019, Da'esh has been actively attempting to engage in large-scale terrorist activities in Ethiopia. It is reported that Da'esh has recruited, trained and dispatched fighters to undertake terrorist activities in Ethiopia. Intelligence sources have identified an extensive network with members recruited from across the country. Two other terrorist groups, namely Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab, have been keen to expand their activities to Ethiopia, but without apparent success. Al Shabaab and Da'esh have become active in their endeavor to penetrate, recruit, and radicalize Ethiopian youth since Ethiopia's military intervention in Somalia in the year 2006, again without success (Marchal 2011: 63).

Kenya: Kenya has no active terror cells as the terrorist threat to the country emanates from Al Shabaab's operatiions in Somalia and Da'esh affiliates in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia and Mozambique. Kenya has continued to play a leading role in efforts geared towards disrupting Al Shabaab and Da'esh recruitment. The country is a key player in regional counter terrorism cooperation and a member of the global coalition for the defeat of Da'esh.

Somalia: Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab and Da'esh operate in Somalia. These terror organizations have also spread to other IGAD Member States. Post-Raqa Da'esh has created a centralized network of provinces, affiliates and individual sympathizers. Somalia is the hub of Al Qaeda East Africa.

Al-Shabaab is Somalia's 'armed Islamist extremist and self-declared al-Qaeda affiliate organization', which continues its operations in Somalia. In 2021, the group remained the principal security challenge to Somalia and IGAD Member States, with widespread penetration and influence. Da'esh in Somalia is primarily made up of Al-Shabaab defectors. The rivalry between Da'esh and Al Shabaab for recruits became apparent when Al-Shabaab assassinated Da'esh's deputy commander in Mogadishu in 2018.

Al-Shabaab has significantly increased its use of drones to conduct reconnaissance flyovers and record the activities of security forces. Its weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles and the group's intent and capacity to launch attacks on aircraft and civil aviation infrastructure, poses a lethal and credible threat to Somalia, all neighbouring IGAD Member States and beyond. Al-Shabaab has heightened concerns about the targeting of low-flying aircraft within Somali airspace and along the border between Kenya and Somalia, an important corridor for humanitarian flights and the main route for commercial aircraft landing in Somalia (Security Council 2021: 9)[1].

[1] According to the Security Council, paragraph 22, 2021/655, page 9,"Al-Shabaab has significantly increased its

Presently, Puntland is the region in which Da'esh is most concentrated, followed by Mogadishu. The value of Somalia for Da'esh lies in IS central designating it as a Province, supervising and supporing the activities of the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) in Mozambique and the DRC. If not adequately monitored and combated, Da'esh could pose a greater threat than it does with its current usage of Somalia as an operation hub for its activities in Central and Southern Africa.

South Sudan: Transnational extremist Islamist groups, such as Da'esh, have not carried out military operations, suicide bombings or any other kind of attack on South Sudan soil. However, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) were a threat in early 2005 -2008, but the efforts of the South Sudan People's Defence Force (SSPDF) and the Uganda Peoples's Defence Force (UPDF) have managed to push the LRA first to Gramba National Park in DRC, and finally to the Central African Republic (CAR). However, the rebel activities in that part of South Sudan, and in particular along Juba Nimule highway, could be cited as terrorist attacks, because of their modus operandi and their targets - civilian. These attacks also appears to be similar to other attacks by the LRA.

The fact that Islamic Terrorist groups have not carried out attacks in South Sudan, does not mean that it is free from Da'esh activities. According to the South Sudan National Security sources, Al-Qaeda affiliates, Al-Shabaab and Da'esh entered South Sudan in 2012, one year after independence. Intelligence reports suggest that these groups infiltrated South Sudan

use of drones to conduct reconnaissance flyovers and record the activities of security forces. Member States expressed concern about the threat from weaponized unmanned aerial vehicles and the group's intent and capacity to launch attacks on aircraft and civil aviation infrastructure. That concern was aroused by Al-Shabaab plans to target low-flying aircraft within Somali airspace and along the border between Kenya and Somalia, which is an important corridor for humanitarian flights and the main route for commercial aircraft landing in Somalia. Al-Shabaab possesses man-portable air defence systems and other conventional weapons that could damage aircraft. Member States also noted the prosecution in the United States of Cholo Abdi Abdullah (not listed), who was undergoing pilot training in the Philippines, as evidence of Al-Shabaab intent in that regard".

from Somalia, via Kenya. They entered in small numbers, but whether they passed through land borders or arrived by air, remains unknown. However, what is known is that they intend to use South Sudan to recruit South Sudanese Muslims, and for a place to rest, after participating in battles in other countries, such as Somalia, CAR, or elsewhere where Da'esh is active. Reportedly, the group's members have taken a mosque near the Custom Market in Juba as their base (Human Rights Watch 2013: 21).

Sudan: Sudan offers a unique case wherein transnational Islamist Jihadist terrorist organizations operate overtly, exploiting a conducive environment; this is particularly interesting considering that an alleged relationship with international Jihadist networks in the past, led to Sudan being designated as a 'country sponsoring terrorism' by the International Community, during the now defunct regime of Omar El Bashir (1989-2018). The onset of transnational Islamist terrorist activities proliferated during the National Islamic Front (NIF) reign, and its successor the National Congress Party (NCP), introduced a raft of radical Islamist policies that antagonized secular Sudanese, its neighbours and the international community.

After the 2019 political change, the Sudan transitional government closed the offices of Hamas, Hizbullah and El-Gamaa al-Islamiyya. These organizations were active in smuggling arms from Iran, through Port Sudan to the Gaza Strip. These organizations view the Sudan transitional government with disdain, following its rapprochement with Israel and the opening of Sudan's airspace for Israeli commercial flights (See Kaminski-Morrow, in Flight Global 2020).

Da'esh poses a serious threat to the security of Sudan and other IGAD Member States. Three Da'esh terrorist attacks were executed in Sudan since the beginning of the transitional period in 2019. During this period, Da'esh conducted a failed assassination attempt on the life of Sudan's transitional Prime Minister, Abdalla Hamdok, in 2020 and it then attempted this twice in 2021. The release of a senior Da'esh/Sudan member after the November 25 military coup

against the transitional government, is instructive. Therefore, Sudan should maintain vigilance and continue with the reform of its institutions, legal and policy instruments, and security apparatus, in order to shift from state-sponsored terrorism to a state countering terrorism.

Uganda: Uganda also offers a unique case, wherein groups described by the Government of Uganda as terrorists not only include radical Islamists (Al Qaeda, Al-Shabaab and Da'esh) but also radical Christian groups such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Uganda's homegrown terrorist group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), is a devout ally of Da'esh, and could, arguably, be equated to Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab affiliates.

Uganda's Internal Security Organization (ISO) stated that there was proof (Counter Terrorism Analysis, Uganda Police, 2021) that the Islamic State (IS) was collaborating with the ADF in DRC since 2019. In October and November 2021, Da'esh masterminded attacks in Kampala for which the Islamic State in Central Province claimed responsibility.

In short, during the last three years, Da'esh and Al Shabaab activities have become more prominent, bringing with them the rivalries and infighting which they began in Somalia. Uganda is part of Da'esh's East Africa Province, which is under the tutelage of its hub in Puntland, Somalia. Uganda's security and military intelligence purport to have begun increasingly intercepting new youth recruiting patterns and refugee settlements. In most cases, this situation exists mainly among refugees and vulnerable poor people who were displaced or relocated from Uganda's eastern, central, and western parts. They claim that Al Shabaab and Da'esh recruitment methods have become more sophisticated and involve huge sums of money. Judging by its 2021 attacks in Uganda, it is safe to state that Da'esh poses a serious threat to Ugandan security.

Conclusions

The conclusions respond to the overall results sought by IGAD and are informed by the findings obtained from the field studies conducted in IGAD member states. These results take into account IGAD-SSP's expectations of the study in response to the terms of reference outlined therein.

a. The study confirms the prevalence of security threats emanating from the presence of terrorist organizations, including Al Qaeda affiliated Al Shabaab, Da'esh, the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). These terrorist organizations vary in scope, magnitude and range of activities, as well as presence from country to country. By far, Da'esh and Al-Shabaab pose the greatest threats, given the depth and breadth of their regional and global networks.

b. The international terrorist networks in the IGAD Member States may differ in how they pursue their objectives. However, they exploit structural and proximate drivers such as poverty, unemployment (particularly among the youth), governance deficits, external interventions and other grievances, as motivating factors to spread their religious-ideological dogma. Typically, these organizations use local grievances to enable hatred against what they perceive as anti-Muslim global dynamics.

c. Some of the most prominent underlying factors for Da'esh gaining support within local populations include direct incentives, such as financial rewards to Muslims from low-income families, creating employment opportunities in underground front businesses, and opportunities to be immersed in Islamic studies in the Middle East and South-East Asia. Important indirect incentives include the promise of being part of the Islamic Umma (or community of believers) and practicing Jihad, which they consider as a duty every Muslim should undergo.

d. Da'esh dynamism, organization, strategy, and networks in general, as well as in specific regional contexts, are fully covered by the study. A critical conclusion is that Somalia is the base for Da'esh activities in Somalia and IGAD Member States. Global Da'esh has created a centralized network of Provinces, affiliates and individual

sympathizers. Somalia is the only country in the IGAD region designated by Da'esh as a Province supporting and coordinating its regional network in all IGAD Member States. It cooperates and coordinates its activities with the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) and Islamic State Southern Africa (ISPSA), in Mozambique, as evidenced by ISCAP claims of masterminding the November 2021 attacks in Kampala, Uganda.

e. IGAD SSP requested the study team to develop case studies, mapping the structures, modus operandi, and networks of Da'esh in its affected Member States or where Da'esh poses security threats. The study is based on 6 case studies – one on each IGAD Member State (see the results per country in the previous section of this study).

f. A nexus between Da'esh terrorist activities is exemplified by four related transnational security threats (TSTs): 1) human trafficking of recruits between and within African countries, for example, from Somalia to other IGAD Member States, or the Libya-Sudan-Chad triangle; 2) As Da'esh financial operations and transfers have gone underground, money laundering has been used to pay for recruits, recruiters, parents and communities, as well as radicalization activities; 3) Arms smuggling to and from countries where Da'esh Provinces, affiliates, and sympathizers are active; 4) Infiltration of refugees and internally displaced persons for radicalization, recruitment, and trafficking in contravention of international humanitarian law.

g. The field studies and available data show that the more Da'esh is displaced from its original bases in Iraq, Syria, and North Africa, the more likely it is to expand in the rest of Africa. Owing to the rivalry between Da'esh and Al Shabaab, there is a direct relationship between Da'esh expansion in IGAD Member States and the Al Shabaab contraction in Somalia.

h. It is difficult to forecast, justify, and provide reasons for the future trajectory of Da'esh and international terrorism in the IGAD region. Such an exercise requires using vast data and building scenarios about the future. It could also be conducted through an analysis of foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and returnees and the tracing of their

movements in the region. However, from the current study, it is possible to glean at least three informed observations: 1) Da'esh and other international terrorist organizations are able to adapt to new situations and in some cases, even ahead of intelligence and counterterrorism professionals. For instance, they can follow Al Shabaab's example and use makeshift drones to attack high-value targets; 2) Increasing virtualization and a reliance on counter-cyber security, with a minimum physical presence. In this regard, international terrorist groups were found to be using mobile money transfers in some Member States, and there is the possibility that they may also use crypto currencies as a means of money laundering to finance their activities; 3) Given the global nature of Da'esh and other terrorist organizations, with their global networks of recruiters, members, affiliates and sympathizers, they could in the future outsource their operations, organization, coordination and equipment to like-minded criminal gangs.

i. Da'esh Province in East Africa (also called ISIS Province in East Africa) is a product of the flight of foreign terrorist fighters from the major bases of ISIS, mainly Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Egypt, as demonstrated by the case studies. It is highly centralized, and Da'esh Middle East hub is in full command and control of the provinces' interventions.

j. The study proposes measures to prevent and counter Da'esh and other international terrorist groups – policy, legislative, administrative, institutional, and operational entry points to address the challenges of Da'esh in the IGAD region.

k. There is an urgent need to institutionalize four policy and operational considerations: 1) leveraging counterterrorism agency and institutional capacity; 2) promulgating counterterrorism legislation; 3) priming the role of youth and both rural and urban communities; and 4) harnessing African regional and international partnerships to counter international terrorist networks.

l. Da'esh and Al Shabaab present profound but differentiated threats to Member States due to their irreconcilable ideological bents, belief systems and behaviors. However,

they share a role in establishing Islamic States in the Muslim World and beyond. Al Shabaab retains the operational capability of constraining geostrategic ambitions, and Da'esh has established a well-coordinated network of Provinces. The case studies illustrate that transnational terrorist networks in the IGAD Member States are interwoven with the local communities and radicalize the youth to join their networks.

Recommendations

I. Leveraging Counterterrorism Agency and Institutional Capacity

a) It is mandatory for Member States that have not yet established functioning counterterrorism institutions beyond counterterrorism committees, to do so as a matter of urgency.

b) It is of profound importance to set priorities and develop a comprehensive cooperative counterterrorism action plan to combat the security threats posed by Da'esh, Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda and other international terrorist affiliates and networks.

c) There is an urgent need to intensify training and capacitate the security and the intelligence community to better respond to security threats posed by international terrorist networks such as Da'esh.

d) Intensifying training and capacitating the security and intelligence community requires establishing counterterrorism institutions, where they do not exist, and strengthening the existing institutions in all Member States.

e) Upgrade and develop new capabilities and technologies (cyber security, intelligence on money laundering by terrorists) to counter the threat of transnational terrorist networks.

f) Intensify IGAD-SSP and Member State cooperation, information exchange and early warning capabilities on countering terrorism with African regional and international partners.

II. Promulgating and firming Counterterrorism legislation

It is mandatory that:

a) The IGAD member states that have not yet promulgated counterterrorism legislation, should do so with utmost urgency. In preparing their counterterrorism legislation, they should explore how they could benefit from the member states that have already established such legislation.

b) Member States should firm and enforce by-laws and action plans to ensure the implementation of counterterrorism legislation.

III Priming the Role of the Youth and Local Communities

It is recommended that IGAD and its Member States:

a) Increase awareness among youth and local communities, of the dangers of terrorism;

b) Build trust between law enforcement agencies, youth and local communities; and

c) Establish counterincentives to terrorism by focusing on youth employment, deradicalization and awareness-raising.

IV Harnessing African Regional, Middle Eastern, and international partnerships to counter international Terrorist Networks

There is an urgent need to:

a) Enhance information and knowledge exchange between IGAD Member States and countries where terrorist groups maintain cross-border, inter-regional and international networks;

b) Enforce border control measures in airports and porous border entry points, in order to prevent the infiltration of terrorist elements; and

c) Hold an annual international conference and involve all Member States, regional and international partners, in order to exchange information and knowledge on new and innovative methods in counterterrorism.

V. IGAD-Specific Recommendations

a) IGAD should develop a regional counter terrorism strategy;

b) IGAD SSP should establish a Terrorism Intelligence Lab (TIL) as part of its regional coordination and cooperation platform, supported by national labs that are integrated across Member States. These national labs should meet regularly to assess and report on the security threats posed by Da'esh and other international terrorist networks in the region that cooperate with it;

c) Increase political and economic cooperation between Member States to rehabilitate and build those borderland areas that act as black holes for relaying terror network logistics, recruits and foot soldiers; and

d) IGAD should support the efforts of Member States to establish and intensify youth deradicalization efforts, increase awareness and support youth employment.

1. Introduction

1.1 Background

The Member States (MS) of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) face multiple security challenges, such as armed conflicts, electoral and political violence, terrorism and violent extremism, arms, human and drugs trafficking, to mention but a few. IGAD, consisting of eight Member States, is one of the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) recognized by the African Union (AU).[2]

IGAD strives to be the premium REC for achieving peace, security and sustainable development, through promoting regional cooperation and integration and enhancing MS capacities. Operating under the guidance of IGAD's Peace and Security structures and the 2016-2020 Peace and Security Strategy, the IGAD Security Sector Programme (IGAD-SSP) has identified transnational security threats (TSTs) as a major overall policy direction and intervention theme. IGAD established its IGAD SSP to implement the strategic priorities on TSTs, as outlined in the third Pillar of the IGAD regional strategy in the fight against TSTs. Hence, the overall objective of IGAD SSP is to promote and strengthen regional and national capacities to predict better, prevent and counter TSTs, and thereby contribute to regional peace and stability and foster an enabling environment for regional integration and development.

More specifically, the IGAD Peace and Security Strategy (2016-2020) prioritized the prevention and countering of TSTs, as key result areas. They acknowledged that TSTs pose a serious threat to security, stability, and economic development and hinder regional

[2] Member States are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda; the eight member, Eritrea, withdrew its membership in 2007. However, Eritrea is still listed as a Member State on the IGAD Website.

integration. One of these TSTs is the terrorist threat posed by the various groups, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), also known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and officially known in Arabic by its acronym - Da'esh. The brutality with which Da'esh executes its heinous crimes has contributed to its designation as a terrorist organization by the United Nations (UN) and many other international organizations and individual countries.

1.2 Purpose, Objectives and Scope

The purpose of the assignment is to describe, explain, analyze and assess, trends and vulnerability factors and threats, focusing on international terrorist organizations such as Da'esh, bearing in mind that the typologies, patterns, modus operandi and behaviour of terrorist groups are dynamic and fluid. An allied purpose is to increase awareness, strengthen monitoring and reporting on mechanisms, complexity and dynamism of these organisations. The study alo intends to provide clarity on the threats that international terrorist networks pose – a situation shrouded in low-level knowledge about the nature, scope, magnitude, types, terminology and impacts of such groups in the IGAD region. Essentially, this assessment aims to avail accurate, timely, relevant, and wide-ranging information as a basis for the formulation of evidence-based policies and their effective implementation.

General Objective of the Assessment: The general objective of this assessment is, therefore, to collect and analyze data and produce viable and realistic evidence-based information about the scope, magnitude and dynamics of Da'esh and other terrorist organisations in the IGAD region, thereby contributing to the knowledge and capacity of IGAD and its Member States to prevent and counter transnational terrorism, in general, and the threat of Da'esh, in particular. Furthermore, there are plans to develop regional and national mechanisms to prevent and counter Da'esh, based on the assessment findings.

Specific objectives of the study: The specific objective of the assignment is to produce validated threats and vulnerability assessments on transnational terrorists like Da'esh. It aims

to produce findings and recommendations that contribute to value-added information on transnational terrorists in the IGAD region and its Member States, in order to foster knowledge-based decision-making and strengthen regional cooperation and coordination. The study report seeks to provide factual knowledge and serve as a baseline to develop effective monitoring and evaluation tools in the fight against Terrorism. Further, the report intends to enhance clarity on the existing data and information gaps, support forecasting, and analyze trends of existing, evolving, and emerging TSTs.

The scope of the assessment covers the trends and dynamics of international terrorist networks such as Da'esh in the IGAD region - in all Member States. Key stakeholder interviews have also been used as a source of information.

1.3 The Setting

The IGAD Member States exist and operate in a complex socio-economic and geopolitical environment, where the population is simultaneously united and divided by a history of different migration patterns (both from within and outside the IGAD subregion), its colonial past, regime types, religion (Islam, Christianity and various traditional beliefs), and ethnicity (more than two hundred ethnic groups and tens of vernacular languages). Ethnically and culturally, there is no IGAD Member State without shared transboundary ethnic groups; some even sometimes present themselves as nationals of three countries.[3] These diverse ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic groups, have been meshed together through past and present state formations as well as the continuous reconfiguration of the internal and external boundaries of the states.

[3] For example the Somali are shared by Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya, while the Afar are found in Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia, and the Oromo can be found in both Ethiopia and Kenya. Likewise, the Dinka, Shilluk, Anuak, Nuer, and Baggara, inhabit Sudan and South Sudan, while the Acholi, Bari, Azande, and Turkana are found in South Sudan and Uganda, and the Nuer, and Anuak, in Ethiopia and South Sudan.

Religious, ethnic, and cultural diversity, by themselves do not produce terrorists or engender conflicts by their sheer presence. This study reveals that such factors are weaponized and become potent drivers of conflict in response to internal and external dynamics informed by structural and proximate factors.

Therefore, the conspicuous presence of transnational terrorist networks such as Da'esh in the IGAD region, can be attributed to structural and proximate factors. Prominent among these factors is that all IGAD Member States qualify for designation as 'Least Developing Countries', except for Kenya, which has been designated by the World Bank as a Middle-Income Country (World Bank 2021). They are among the 46 least developed countries in the World. Although poverty is an important factor in facilitating the recruitment of poor youth, it is safe to argue that it is not the main driver of terrorism. In some contexts, non-material factors such as religious devotion, external and internal grievances against perceived state capture and severe governance deficits, can be more important drivers.

In 2019, IGAD Member States had an average Gross Nation Income (GNI) per capita, Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) of $3,157, compared with an African average of $3,500. However, there are considerable variations in GNI per capita, PPP, ranging from $2,003 in South Sudan, $5,620 in Djibouti, $4,370 in Kenya, $3,970 in Sudan, $2,260 in Uganda and $2,410 in Ethiopia (Table 1.1).

Table 1.1: IGAD HDI ranking, life expectancy, expected years of schooling and GNI per capita income

HDI Rank	Country	HID value	Life expectancy at birth, (years)	Expected years of schooling (years)	Mean years of schooling (years)	Gross National Income (GNI) per capita (PPP$)
161	Djibouti	0.524	67.1	6.8	4.1	5,689
173	Ethiopia	0.485	66.6	8.8	2.9	2,207
143	Kenya	0.601	66.7	11.3	6.6	4,244

	Somalia[4]		57.4	10.0	6.7	
185	South Sudan	0.433	57.9	5.3	4.8	2,003
170	Sudan	0.510	65.3	7.9	3.8	3,829
159	Uganda	0.544	63.4	11.4	6.2	2,123

Source: Human Development Index (HDI) Ranking 2020, available at https://hdr.undp.org/en/content/latest-human-development-index-ranking [accessed 10 October 2021]

Grievances emanating from concurrent economic and environmental shocks are exacerbated by extreme inequality. For example, the 2021 data shows that, on average, the top 1% share 15% of the national income, while 50% of the bottom share 13% of the national income. IGAD Member States exhibit an overall average poverty rate of 33.89% among the youth (15-24 years of age). About 50-60% of the population is under 25 years of age.[5]

Table 1.2: IGAD population, youth (in millions) and youth % of the total population, 2012-2020

Country	Total Population (in million)	Total Youth (15-34), in million.	Youth as % of total population	Total Population (in million)	Total Youth (15-34) in million	Youth as % of total population
	2012	**2012**	**2012**	**2020**	**2020**	**2020**
Djibouti	0.868	0.327	37.6	0.988	0.354	35.8
Ethiopia	92.727	31.068	33.5	114.964	41.934	36.5
Kenya	44.343	15.985	36.0	53.771	19.630	35.5
Somalia	12.715	3.960	31.1	15.893	5.381	33.9
South Sudan	10.114	3.406	33.6	11.194	3.908	34.9
Sudan	36.194	12.076	33.4	43.849	15.227	34.7
Uganda	34.559	11.589	33.4	45.741	15.978	39.9
Total	231.52	78.411	34.1	286.40	102.412	35.8

[4] There is no entry on Somalia in the Human Development Reports. However, Somalia's last Human Development Report was published in 2012. The entries in this table are reproduced from various sources of World Bank Data for 2019.

[5] African Union (2006), African Youth Charter. Available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/7789-treaty-0033_-_african_youth_charter_e.pdf [accessed 10 October 2021].

Source: UN (2021) World Population Prospects, published by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. Available at https://population.un.org/wpp/Download/Standard/Population/ [accessed 10 October 2021]

These structural factors have impacted the population of IGAD Member States, which ranked very low in the Human Development Index (2020), ranging from South Sudan (185), Ethiopia (174), Sudan (170), Djibouti (161) and Uganda (159), and Kenya (143). Kenya ranked as the best performing and the only Middle-Income Country in the IGAD region (World Bank 2021). Despite its Middle-Income country status, Kenya has been prone to terrorist attacks due to its proximity to Somalia, large shared borders and participation in count-terrorism efforts.

These structural factors by themselves do not explain the presence or absence of transnational terrorist networks. Still, they act as catalysts when combined with proximate factors such as low levels of literacy and ignorance of Islamic teachings. For example, the illiteracy rate in Djibouti was 70%, Ethiopia (48.2%), Kenya (18%), Somalia (62.2%), South Sudan (68%), Sudan (41.4%), and Uganda (22%). Jihadists exploit local community grievances against the state, particularly state oppression and abuse of human rights. Jihadists isolate ethnic and regional rivalries and conflicts from their local contexts by a gloss of religious coating in order to entice division and win community members over to their fold.

Transnational terrorists operate in a globally networked web of member and affiliate groups energized by religious zeal and hostility to the West. For them, the West is perceived as a threat to Islam, while conversely, the West views radical Islam as a threat to the main tenets of the Western way of life – democracy, the rule of law and a functioning secular state.

2. Major Terrorist Networks in the IGAD Region: History, leaders and name change

2.1 Terrorist organizations' history

This section is intended to provide some background on both past and present transnational Jihadist networks in the IGAD region. However, it is difficult, almost impossible, to cover all past and present transnational Jihadist networks operating in the IGAD region. Therefore, the scope of this section is limited to providing a chronological elucidation of the recent historical background of transnational terrorist networks such as the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA, Uganda), the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF, Uganda), Al-Qaeda, Al Shabaab and Da'esh. The study delineates these transnational terrorist organizations, in turn.

2.1.1 Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)

The LRA has probably been one of the most traumatic terrorist organizations in Uganda, starting in 1987 and continuing to the present day, it continues to spread to other parts of the region. Joseph Kony, a former lay catechist in the Catholic Church, established the LRA as a rival to Alice Auma Lakwena. Lakwena led the Holy Spirit Movement (HSM) in northern Uganda, and was defeated at Jinja in 1987, as HSM marched towards Kampala to attempt to topple the government. The group that arose after the defeat of the HSM was first called 'The Lord's Army' (LA) before changing its name to 'Uganda People's Democratic Christian Army' (UPDCA) and finally settling upon the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). With the demise of the HSM, the group degenerated into factions, one led by Alice Lakwena herself and the other by her father, Severino. Both claimed to be possessed by the holy spirit to lead a rebellion through which they would 'cleanse' the land of sinful leaders. The major difference between the two, was that while Alice Lakwena held a monopoly on this 'holy spirit possession' in her group, in Severino's group, this possession was, in a sense, more democratic; anyone could be possessed with the spirits and be permitted to fight.

One result of the disagreement between Alice and Severino was that Kony exploited the situation to entrench his group. After having disagreed bitterly with the two earlier, he claimed that only the military could lead in war, according to his brand of Christianity and that all former versions were witchcraft, while his was not. Despite reports of dabbling in spirit possession, the LRA rebellion is a bizarre mixture of religion, spiritualism and politics. The LRA has gone back and forth between posing as a religious fundamentalist group fighting to restore the ten commandments and posing as a rebel group with the political aim of toppling the corrupt and sectarian government of the National Resistance Movement (NRM). Much of the analysis of this rebellion either takes the group to represent remnants of African banditry or pseudo-religious fanaticism. However, the LRA is a more complex player in a complex political process.

The LRA has attempted to present a more organized political agenda in recent years. This apparent change in tactics from a spiritualist to a political group, is interesting. Dr James Obita Alfred claims to be the LRA's secretary for external affairs and mobilization. In 1997, at a 'Kacoke Madit' ('big meeting') conference organized by the Ugandan Acholi diaspora in London, he presented the 'political agenda' of the LRA. He outlined six aims and objectives of the LRA, the foremost of which was to remove dictatorship and stop the oppression of Ugandans. During the peace talks under the Juba Peace Initiative, when Vincent Otti (second in command of the LRA) was asked whether his group was fighting for religious reasons, he answered in the affirmative, and added that the LRA was 'fighting in the name of God' for the Ten Commandments.

This dilemma presents an image of a seemingly confused group in terms of their agenda, and to the uninitiated, this talk is political gibberish and complete nonsense. It was exactly why the LRA has managed to hoodwink the international community and defy conventional analyses and approaches to its resolution, for quite some time. The rebellion represents itself

as illogical and disconnected from contemporary norms of political behaviour. Generally, most conventional theories of rebellion use rational choice or utility theory to analyze and predict rebel behaviour. However, the unpredictability and instability encountered in particular cases of collective dissent-renders analysis, as usual, is cumbersome unless the focus is placed on the underlying politics. In 1998, David Nyekoraan Matsanga, a senior official of the LRA, left and formed the Uganda Salvation Front. They attacked prisons in Tororo and abducted several inmates, forcing them to join their army.

In 2005, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued arrest warrants against LRA leader, Joseph Kony, and other top commanders, accusing them of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In January 2015, LRA leader, Dominic Ongwen, surrendered himself, and after a four-year trial, was convicted on February 4, 2021. The LRA has continued to operate in the remote border between South Sudan, and the DRC. According to the LRA Crisis Tracker organization, the LRA carried out 42 attacks in 2019, leaving 31 dead and abducting 192, mainly in the remote DRC-CAR-South Sudan border areas.

A concerted campaign by activists in the US, led by former US president, Barack Obama, attempted to sign a law in 2010 that allowed the deployment of around 100 special forces to work with regional armies to hunt down Kony. However, despite the commendable international and regional campaign to apprehend Kony, his whereabouts remain unknown. Although the number of LRA fighters has dwindled, its staying power, brutality and capacity to terrorize the local communities across many countries, should not be underestimated.[6]

[6] Schomerus, M. (2021). *The Lord's Resistance Army: Violence and Peacemaking in Africa*. Loyle et al (2021). Loyle et al (2021). Justice during the War with the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda. Atkison, Ronald R. (2009). From Uganda to the Congo and Beyond: Pursuing the Lord's Resistance Army.

2.1.2 Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)

Sheikh Muhammad Yunus Kamoga founded the ADF in the early 1990s. Upon its establishment, a segment/sect of the Tabliq Muslim group tried to use violence to take control of the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council. He fled to Kenya following the 1991 attack on Old Kampala Mosque, and only returned to Uganda after the government offered amnesty to several rebels. Sheikh Kamoga and Sheikh Jamil Mukulu led the youths who twice stormed the Old Kampala Mosque to take over the Uganda Muslim Supreme Council (UMSC) offices. During the second attack, in March 1991, four policemen were killed. Some 431 Tabliq fighters, including Jamil Mukulu, were arrested and charged with murder, but the charges were later dropped. Kamoga later denied any connection with the ADF.

The deadly attack on the mosque was executed by a group of about 300 radical Tabliq youths. Young Muslim converts had been gathered from across the country and radicalized during religious classes (Madrassas) inside different mosques, such as William Street Mosque, and Nakasero Market Mosque, among others. In 1991, they attacked a mosque along Namirembe road (Kampala) near the Muslim Supreme Council headquarters, hacking one police officer and a police dog, with a machete. Tabliq aims to create an authentic Islamic State in Uganda. The NRM government responded with great force, arresting some and dispersing other Tabliq members.

Upon their release in 1994, they formed the Salafi Foundation and fled to Hoima in western Uganda, where they set up training bases. Jamil Mukulu was educated in Saudi Arabian universities and received military training in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tabliqs had for long espoused the view that Muslims in Uganda were marginalized and secondly that most Muslims in the country co-exist peacefully with non-Muslims. With many sympathizers, Mukulu put his military knowledge to use in creating the ADF. In 1995, the Ugandan army overran the Tabliq bases in western Uganda, forcing them to flee to the DRC, where they linked up with the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) to form the ADF. The

new alliance (calling itself ADF/NALU) is also included. They set up bases in neighbouring Congo and began recruiting fighters, promising them money and education. It was easier to recruit in the Congo, where people were not hostile to the ADF. The stated goal of the ADF is to overthrow the Government of Uganda and establish an Islamic State (European Institute of Peace, 2018:37).

The ADF rebel group was originally regarded as a peripheral group that lacked a clear political agenda (Kristof and Vlassenroot, 2012). Different forces and groups merged in an unusual partnership to give rise to the ADF and included:

i) radical elements within Uganda's Tabliq Muslim sect;
ii) disgruntled fighters from the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU);
iii) fighters from the Rwenzururu Movement, a tribalist outfit which espoused the use of violence to create a state of the Bakonjzo; and
iv) West Nile Bank Front fighters who were loyal to former Ugandan dictator, Idi Amin, and backed by the Sudanese and Congolese governments. (Nantulya, 2019).

The group soon became dominated by Saudi-educated clerics and violent soldiers that rejected integration into Museveni's National Resistance Army (NRA). The group easily morphed into extremist Islamic ideologies because Mukulu used his network with other radical Muslims and international supporters of Islamist causes worldwide, to raise funds for the group. These included places like Saudi Arabia, London, Tanzania, and Sudan. Their modus operandi increasingly became terrorism and they carried out several attacks against the country.

Figure 2.1: Mapping streams of influence into the ADF:



The ADF has continued carrying out sporadic terror attacks against the government and citizens of Uganda. Originally a Ugandan movement, it has been based for most of its existence in the DRC, where it became part of local power struggles and conflicts. While this might indicate that the ADF has lost most of its Ugandan character, it is still considered a foreign rebel force or a "rebel group in exile" such as the LRA (Kristof & Vlassenroot, 2012). Recent reports indicate that with the arrest of Jamil Mukulu, the ADF has established an affiliation with ISIS and changed its name to Islamic State in Central Africa Province

2.1.3 Al Shabaab

Al Shabaab was formally established in 2006 and emerged as a militant splinter group of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). The extremist group, Harakat al Shabaab al-Mujahideen (aka Al-Shabaab), is based in Somalia but conducts operations in Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and other East African countries and continentally. Al-Shabaab has been one of the most dominant violent extremist groups in East Africa since its emergence in Somalia in 2006. The term "Al-Shabaab" means "the youth", and it has proved to be a savvy marketing and promotional name that has attracted jihadist fighters from around the world to join the movement. Al

Shabaab's origin can be traced to the late 1970s and early 1980s, towards the end of the Cold War. Many Somalis joined the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s and returned home after the war. These returnees came back with ideological and organizational skills that were applied to the building of Al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab was an autonomous, militant wing of the Somali Council of Islamic Courts (CIC) that took over most of southern Somalia by 2005. The organization comprises Islamists who had fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s and others who always prioritized military struggle against *da'wa*. Its exclusivist neo-Salafi ideology is a way to become global, connect with other groups such as al-Qaeda, and keep Somali customs at bay (Marshal, 2009).

In 2008, the US Government designated al-Shabaab as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist entity. In 2012, the Rewards for Justice program added several al-Shabaab leaders to its site, offering large rewards for information leading to their capture. In 2010, the European Union designated al-Shabaab a terrorist organization; this helped with the soliciting of financial and training resources for the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISON).

Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabaab) has proven itself a highly adaptable organization. Their most recent evolution has seen them transform from an overt, military and governmental force in southern Somalia, to a covert insurgent force (Anderson and McKnight, 2015). The collapse of the Somali state provided a vacuum that allowed the rise of Al-Shabaab. The insurgent group gained public support because they assisted in bringing some order, organizing the community, and establishing courts of law based on the Sharia system. But soon, the extreme application of the Sharia law began turning public opinion against them, and soon, in order to maintain their hold on power, the organization turned to the use of terror (Seth et al. 2016). This terrorism soon spilt into neighboring countries, thus making Al-Shabaab a regional problem.

After the military defeat of the CIC, the group splintered into smaller factions. In the process, Al-Shabaab emerged as the most vibrant offshoot and it established a regional Islamic theocracy. By February 2012, the Amir of Al-Shabaab and Ayman al-Zawahiri, leader of Al-Qaeda, publicly announced the merger of these two terrorist groups. There are indications that its current leadership has been thinking of affiliating with or joining the Islamic State (IS). Over the past five years, AMISOM forces have directed attacks against Al-Shabaab strongholds, taking over strategic locations such as Merca and, in the process, depriving Al-Shabaab of territory, logistical capacity, and resources - particularly the port of Kismayu (Brandon and Pkalya, 2017).

2.1.4 Al Qaeda

The onset of terrorist activities in Sudan began soon after 1989 when military officers aligned with the National Islamic Front (NIF) overthrew Sudan's last democratically elected government. The NIF commenced its rule with a raft of radical Islamist policies which antagonized its neighbours and the international community. Among the most conspicuous policies was providing safe haven to international terrorist groups and their leaders. Sudan provided refuge, logistical support, training facilities, travel documents, and weapons to various radical terrorist organizations (UN, Security Council 1996 and Baldo 2017).

In 1990, Sudan dropped visa requirements for Arabs. It opened its doors to militant organizations to raise money for the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) during the 1991 parliamentary election campaign. (The final stage of these elections was cancelled when the Government feared the FIS might win). And in November 1991, the first armed operation was conducted against the Algerian Government. In October 1990, the Egyptian Government closed its airspace to flights from Sudan, seized nearly 200 machine guns smuggled across the

desert into Upper Egypt, and asserted that the men who had killed Egypt's Speaker of parliament in October, had trained in Sudan.[7]

In 1991, Hassan Al-Turabi launched the Popular Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC), which brought together leaders of militant Islamist groups to resist America's "recolonization of the Islamic world". Many Arab mujahideen (holy warriors) who were perceived as threats to security in their own countries, sought sanctuary in Sudan.[8]

Under the guidance of Hassan El Turabi, camps to train Muslim militants were established outside Port Sudan and Khartoum. As early as May 1990, some 60 Arabs from North Africa, France, and Belgium, began to train in the Shambat district of Khartoum for sabotage operations in Europe. And in December 1991, the first 19 fighters from Kashmir completed a six-month training program; El Turabi joined government officials to address their graduation ceremony. In October 1990, Osma Bin Laden moved to Sudan. In addition to his vast financial and investment empire in Sudan, he spent $2 million to fly 5000 Arab mujahideen to Sudan, and equipped 23 training camps in Shendi, north of Khartoum. Bin Laden's Egyptian partner, Ayman al-Zawahiri, who led Al Qaeda after his death, apparently managed Bin laden's international financial networks, using Islamic banks, couriers, and charities to accumulate and move funds from Zawahiri's safe haven in Geneva.[9]

In 1993, due to Sudan's alleged support of Islamic transnational Jihadist networks, the United States placed Sudan on the list of state sponsors of terrorism and applied unilateral sanctions consistent with that designation. At that time, it was not known that Bin Laden was conceiving of the ideas which gave rise to Al Qaeda. As Robert James Woolsey, the former Director of US

[7] It is estimated that the human cost was about 46,000 Afghans killed (by all sides) and 2.2 million displaced. Some 20,722 American soldiers were injured and 2,455 were killed. The financial cost of the US war on terror in Afghanistan from 2001-2021, was estimated at US$ 2.3 trillion.
[8] Lesch 2002: 204.
[9] Ibid. 2002: 204.

Central Intelligence, noted, few, if any, in the US government even knew of the existence of Bin Laden's terrorist network at the time. But, as subsequent Department of State annual reports indicated, Sudan formed an alliance with Al-Qaeda in the early-1990s.[10]

This brief background to Sudan's former government's involvement with radical Islamist groups facilitates the effort to map their past activities and organization from Sudan. The 1995 assassination attempt on President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Sudan's refusal to extradite the three suspects, prompted United Nations Resolution 1044. It required Sudan to extradite the three suspects to Ethiopia for prosecution. It enjoined Sudan to desist from assisting, supporting and facilitating terrorist activities and giving shelter or sanctuary to terrorist elements.[11]

It is worth noting that Osama Bin Laden had significantly benefitted from his Sudan years, which enabled him to establish a worldwide network, including the Popular Arab Islamic Conference (PAIC) leaders. He was also able to establish rapport with leaders of militant Islamic Jihadist groups such as the Abu Nidal organization, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya. When he left for Afghanistan under pressure from the US, he had already organized a large pool of trained Afghan militants to launch Al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 1998.[12]

The bombings of the US embassies in Nairobi (Kenya), and Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) on August 7, 1998, were a turning point in Al Qaeda's history and the history of terrorism. Sudan was linked to the two bombings, which induced further sanctions by the United States, European Union and the United Nations. [13]

[10] Chanzer 2012.
[11] UN, Security Council 1996.
[12] Beard, 2001.
[13] Collins and Burr, 2003.

However, 9/11 was Al-Qaeda's most devastating attack, which left its mark on global history and immortalized the organization as one of the world's most lethal. Its US$ 500,000 attack cost thousands of lives and trillions of US Dollars.[14]

After Bin Laden departured from Sudan, the effects of the sanctions began to hurt the economy. Sudan took steps to cut off ties with external terrorist networks and arrested some thirty suspected terrorists. It agreed to cooperate with the US in its counter-terrorism activities, including sharing classified information on Bin Laden and his terror network inside and outside Sudan.[15]

Osama Bin Laden, the slain leader of Al Qaeda, found refuge in Sudan (1991-1996) before leaving for Afghanistan. While in Sudan, he made substantial investments in constructing roads, airports, agriculture and cattle raising. Bin Laden also recruited and trained thousands of Mujahideen. Two years after he left Sudan, Bin Laden announced the creation of Al Qaeda in 1998.

That distant history of the Bin Laden years in Sudan not only shaped his views about Al Qaeda but created bonds with the Islamic movement of Sudan, which resulted in partnerships that continue to date. Pre-2018 Sudan is not strange to Al Qaeda, its affiliates and operatives in almost all IGAD Member States, Africa and its global networks. These old relations and networks have endured to date.

The eclipse of Al Qaeda coincided with the rise of Da'esh (ISIL) and the creation of the short-lived Islamic State (IS). Da'esh made use of the Islamic Jihadist groundwork of Al Qaeda. It

[14] Knickmeyer 2021.
[15] Rubin 2001.

cooperated with Al Qaeda affiliates and sympathetic communities across the globe, while developing its peculiar brand of Sunni Jihadism.

The demise of Da'esh and the collapse of the Islamic State, meant an earnest search for new spaces where it could continue its strategic objective of spreading Sunni Islam throughout the world and confront its enemies. Post-Raqa Da'esh has created a centralized network of Provinces, affiliates and individual sympathizers.

It is an open secret that the Chad-Sudan-Libya triangle is a vibrant Da'esh recruitment region and a fighters' market. Sudan knows that Da'esh does not have an organized presence, such as affiliated organizations, but it does not exclude individual sympathizers. Libya is the fighters' market of choice, where Sudanese individuals or affiliates to Darfur Liberation movements have targeted the Libyan "mercenary" market.

To be sure, Sudan hosted Al Qaeda and Libya's Islamic Jihad, leaders of militant Islamic Jihadist groups such as the Abu Nidal organization, Hamas, Hezbollah, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Al-Gamaat al-Islamiyya.[16] Thanks to the 2018 popular uprising which ousted the National Congress Party, the offices of these radical jihadist organizations have been closed, and their assets confiscated.

The cooperation between these organizations and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard was centred on arms smuggling from Port Sudan to Sinnai and the Gaza Strip. In the past few years, arms shipments through Sudan prompted Israel to stage missile strikes against rocket warehouses in Khartoum and trucks transporting arms from Port Sudan to the Gaza Strip.

[16] Chome 2020, Baldo 2017, and Polch 2010.

Arms smuggling through Port Sudan has ended with the transitional government opening Sudan air space to Israel and the pending normalizing of relations between Sudan and Israel. However, renegade individuals from the defunct NCP and the security apparatus may continue smuggling arms from Iran to the Gaza Strip through Port Sudan. Unfortunately, Sudan cannot guarantee the sealing of its 750 km-long Red Sea coastline.

2.1.5 Da'esh

The Islamic State is sometimes referred to as ISIS, ISIL, or Da'esh. It started as a remnant of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) a local offshoot of Al Qaeda which was founded by Abu Musab al Zarqawi in 2004. It disappeared for years, after the USA operations in Iraq started in 2007; then, it came back into the limelight in 2011. The group changed its name to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013. In June 2014, its leader, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, announced a caliphate stretching from Aleppo in Syria to Diyala in Iraq and renamed the group the Islamic State (IS).

The Da'esh operations in the IGAD region are reported to have started in Somalia in 2015. The Islamic State's territorial defeat in Iraq and Syria forced the group to look outwards, effectively expanding its geographic reach and rebranding itself as a global jihadist movement. Since 2019, the group has ramped up operations in Central Asia and West Africa, among other regions (Raafat, 2021). The slogan of the Islamic State is 'remaining and expanding' (baqiya wa tatamadad). It is reported that Islamic State is in a rivalry with Al-Shabaab. Potentially, in Somalia, Da'esh has some appeal because it is not mired in a static insurgency and does not suffer the lack of political credibility and religious legitimacy that Al-Shaba suffers (EIP, 2018). This contention can be attributed to the fact that IS or Da'esh is not involved in terrorist activities inside Somalia. In Somalia, Da'esh is no more than a coordinating and training hub, or ISIS Central Africa Province, supervising and coordinating but not involved in attacks inside Somali. In other words, Al Shabaab gets all the negative local, national and global publicity from its attacks, while Da'esh is seen as a provider of opportunities for local procurement and recruitment of zealous unemployed youth.

According to the 2020 Global Terrorism Index (GTI), despite the Islamic State's overall decrease in activities in the Middle East and North Africa, the group has become especially prominent in sub-Saharan Africa (see Figure 2.1 for the IS organizational structure in Africa). It led to an upturn in terrorism, resulting in seven out of the ten countries that have witnessed the largest increase in terrorism situated in the region (Raafat, ibid). Across the continent, in the semi-autonomous northern Somali stretch of Puntland, a group known as the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) recently became the first Islamic State affiliate to hold territory in that county. In contrast, further south, another Islamic State affiliate known as the Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda, has raised concerns (Jason, 2017).

Many Ethiopians sorrowfully recall the Islamic State in Libya's assassination of two groups of Ethiopian migrants in April 2015, which sent a shock to the nation. The Ethiopian Orthodox Church and Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council (EIASC) are the central organizing body for interfaith relations. They condemned this killing of 28 Ethiopian Christians in Libya by an arm of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, describing them as genocidal acts, not in line with the teachings in religious texts.[17]

In March 2015, a few weeks before Nigeria's Boko Haram announced its allegiance to ISIS, an 'emissary' of ISIS called Hamil Al-Bushra, released an audio message praising the 'brothers in Somalia'. He encouraged them to attack "inside Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia" and advised Abu Ubaidah, the then leader of Al-Shabaab, to pledge loyalty to ISIS.[18] This advice was not heeded

[17] Allafrica.com (2015) "Ethiopian Muslim Affairs Supreme Council, Ethiopian Orthodox Church Condemn IS Killings," 21 April 2015, http://allafrica.com/stories /201504230012.html; Jon Abbink (2020) "Religion and Violence in the Horn of Africa: Trajectories of Mimetic Rivalry and Escalation between 'Political Islam' and the State", *Politics, Religion & Ideology*, April 2020.

[18] Nur Aziemah Binte Azman and Syed Huzaifah Bin Othman Alkaf (2015) ISIS in Horn of Africa: An Imminent Alliance with Al-Shabab? *RSIS Commentary No. 282*, 30 December 2015

by Al Shabaab, which as was explained earlier, became a devout enemy of IS Somalia, accusing it of recruiting its members.

In October 2015, a group of several dozen former Al-Shabaab fighters in the Golis highlands of north-eastern Somalia declared allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria/ISIS/ under Abdulkadir Ali Mumin's command. Currently, however, the number of members of the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS), comprising mainly members of Mumin's own *Ali Saleebaan* sub-clan, is estimated to range from 200 to 300. However, as it has carried out limited terrorist operations compared with Al Shabaab so far, the group is generally assessed to have focused on activities related to recruitment and radicalization programmes.[19]

From an unpromising start in 2015, the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) had survived an onslaught by its far more powerful rival, Al-Shabaab, and had established a secure base in Puntland. Furthermore, towards the end of 2017 and into 2018, it had begun to show operational capacity in Mogadishu, challenging al-Shabaab's dominance in the key battleground against the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS).[20]

Since 2018, because ISIS has been under immense pressure in the Middle East region, the group has expanded its international networks. Accordingly, with a focus on Africa, it has established branches in Eastern, Central, Northern, and Western Africa. In doing so, the group is establishing links with (co-opting) armed Islamic militia groups and using the continent's existing economic and social problems as opportunities for recruitment.

Islamic State in Puntland, an ISIS branch of the East Africa region, has successfully managed to establish contacts with the other regional ISIS affiliate groups in Africa, particularly the

[19]The Global Strategy Network (2018*) Islamic State in East Africa*, September 2018
[20] Ibid. 2018

Mozambique-based IS-Central Africa. It provides support such as training and guidance on conducting attacks in their operational areas.[21]

As part of Da'esh Central Africa Province-DRC, the group has expanded to countries in the Eastern African region, including Ethiopia, and Sudan. Beginning from 2019, the group has extended its reach to Ethiopia and started building its networks by recruiting members from Ethiopia's Somali State. Since then, recruitment and radicalization have been underway in the country.[22]

The group has been recruiting members from Ethiopian refugees in Puntland and providing them with training. The group has been recruiting Ethiopian refugees stranded in Puntland and in-and-around *Dolo Odo*, an Ethiopian border town near the Ethio-Somalia border. These refugees are Ethiopians heading to Arab countries in search of jobs. An individual reportedly trained the recruited Ethiopians from Moyale at *Habato* training camp, located in the *Tirmish* area of Puntland. The group has reportedly trained some of its members to build its networks and commit suicide attacks on yet unspecified targets in Ethiopia. The training was conducted in an area located near *Togochale,* one of Ethiopia's customs towns located in the Eastern part of the country, close to the Ethio-Somalia border.[23]

Apart from expansion from Puntland, individuals who have direct links with Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS) and Islamic State in Libya, are operating inside Ethiopia. The main objective of those individuals is to recruit Ethiopian nationals. Besides ISIS's past failed attempt to conduct an attack inside Ethiopia in early April 2019, the group's core leaders have decided to expand their realm of recruitment inside Ethiopia, via diverse channels such as social media and human trafficking networks operating in the country.

[21] Intelligence sources
[22] Intelligence Sources
[23] Ibid. 2018

In 2019, the media department of ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) ordered the production and dissemination of propaganda that targets Ethiopia. This main media division of ISIS emphasized that Ethiopia is a strategic country on which the group needs to focus. Accordingly, it called upon its followers to use *Al-Hijiratyn and Al-Murasalat*, the Media foundations used by Ethiopian militants associated with ISIS affiliates in Somalia, to introduce the group's activities to potential followers in Ethiopia. Especially, the *Al-Hijitaryn* media foundation, which is run by an IS member of Ethiopian-Somali origin, living in South Africa, and spreads Da'esh's propaganda material in languages widely used in Ethiopia, including Amharic, Afaan Oromo, Tigrigna and Somaligna.[24]

Dr Muhammad Ali Al-Jazouli, the general coordinator of Al-Umma Al-Wahida or "One Nation", is the Emir of Da'esh in Sudan. He was born in Al-Husseinab in North Sudan and graduated with a degree in economics from Al-Nileen University. He began his Jihadi career with Al Qaeda, and openly defended Da' esh in several media interviews. He held jobs directly relevant to his Islamists activities including supervisor and general secretary of the Immigrant Demand Care Organization (Iranian, Iraqi and Sri Lankan students). Upon his detention, he vowed to continue his anti-West Jihad activities.

In 2014, after returning from Turkey, where he joined ISIS, he pronounced his allegiance to Islamic State in Syria (ISS) in a Friday sermon. He declared that all U.S. embassies and interests would become "legitimate targets" after a U.S. airstrike on ISIS forces in Iraq. Targets would include tourist resorts, universities, coffee shops, restaurants, aeroplanes, ships, shops, and

[24] "IS Somalia Province Video Courts Muslims In East Africa, Disparages Shabaab," Site Intelligence Group, February 28, 2020, https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Statements/is-somalia-province-video-courts-muslims-in-east-africa-disparages-shabaab.html. Africa News (2019) Ethiopian authorities say Al-Shabaab, Islamic State planning attacks on hotels, available at https://www.africanews.com/2019/09/23/ethiopia-army-arrests-islamic-state-members-recruiting-arming-locals// [accessed 15 December 2021].

companies". In the sermon, he said: "let me address the youths who sit on the side-lines, as reserves. They have not entered the fray. They warm up on the side-lines. Reserves. I say to them: enter the fray and join the game. Suppose a single American plane flies over Iraq to strike at ISIS. In that case, it will be one of our most obligatory religious duties to support the nucleus of the righteous caliphate by turning all the American embassies and interests into legitimate targets".

Al –Jazouli lived up to his chilling promise as far as the youth are concerned. As explained in the next section, he devoted his life to recruiting Sudanese youth and sending them to fight for ISIS in Syria and Iraq and continued these activities after his release from prison in 2016.

Besides Al-Gazouli, the Emir of IS in Sudan, some jihadist organizations are closely affiliated with and have pledged allegiance to IS. For example, the Jihadist Salafist preacher, Masa'ad al-Sidairah, who is also the secretary-general and Emir-general of the Jamaa'at al-I'tisam bi al-Quran wa al-Sunna.

The Islamic State version in the IGAD region nominally refers to itself a "Jahba East Africa". In 2019, the former Director-General of Uganda's Internal Security Organization, Col. Kaka Bagyenda, stated that there was proof that the IS was collaborating with the ADF in DRC. In the October 2021terrorist attacks in Uganda, the Islamic State Central Africa Province claimed responsibility.

Figure 2.2: Islamic State Africa and IGAD Member States



2.2 Leadership

Da'esh Provine in Somalia was created in 2015, i.e., the date Abdikadir Mumin, its leader, pledged allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State, thus creating the Islamic State in Somalia" (Abnaa ul-Calipha). Mumin is located in the Galgala region of Puntland in Somalia. His attempt to encourage Al Shabaab fighters to join Daesh resistance[25] (see Table 2.1) shows that Da'esh leadership is stable and headed by Mumin since its establishment. Mumin is supported by deputies and heads of departments (for example, recruitment, logistics, military operations and finance departments).

[25] Ibid. 2021.

In contrast, Al Shabaab leadership has witnessed many changes since its establishment in 1997. As Table 2.1 (below) shows, the leadership was marred with internal squabbles.

Da'esh, because it was recruiting some Al-Shabaab fighters in 2013, including leaders such as Mukhtar Robow and Abu Mansur al Amriki, was chased out of Al-Shabaab. In 2013 Ibrahim Afghani and Sheikh Burhan (Al-Shabaab leaders in Barawe) could have escaped if they so chose, but they did not and ended up being executed. After this, some fighters and sympathizers who had been loyal to the executed leaders, swore allegiance to al Baghdadi and the Islamic State. The leadership of al Shabaab reacted by ordering the immediate execution of any Islamic State supporters. Al-Shabaab also sent assassination teams against Da'esh recruits from its ranks and killed several of them. However, despite these initial setbacks, IS sympathizers have continued to gain strength and followers around the region (see Table on number of estimated number of fighters).

Table 2.1: The leaders of LRA, ADF, Al Shabaab and Da'esh 1986-2021

Organization	Leader *	Phase/period	Comment
Lord's Resistance Army	Alice Lakwena	1986 – 1989	Led religious fanatical group of rebels; led the Holy Spirit Movement
	Fr. Severino	1987 – 1990	Tried to focus on religious teachings. led the Lord's Army (later called: Uganda people's Democratic Christian Army)
	Joseph Kony Vincent Otti	1989 – 2006	Lord's Resistance Army. The group reached the peak of terror attacks in Uganda and the East Africa region
	David N. Matsanga	1998 – 2001	Tried to change direction of the group but later renounced it and led a splinter faction
Allied Democratic Forces	Muhammad Yunus Kamoga	1988 – 1991	Kamoga focused on puritanical religious teachings, and was responsible for starting the Tabliq religious sect. He renounced the ADF
	Jamil Mukulu	1992 – 2015	Mukulu lead the terror campaigns based in DRC and used the ADF network to internationalize ADF's stature as a terrororganisation.

	Frank Kithasamba	1997-1999	Acted as ADF chairman and oversaw the dissemination of propaganda
	Musa Seka Baluku & Sheikh Ssentongo	2016 – date	Al Shabaab member who built affiliation with ISIS and oversan the change of name to Islamic State in Central Africa Province
Al-Shabaab	Khalif Adaale	2006 – 2007	Joined the Alliance for the Re-Liberation of Somalia which as just created in Asmara at the time
	Saleh Ali Saleh Naban	2007-	Naban was key in swearing a *bayat* (loyalty oath) to *al-Qâ'idah* on behalf of al-Shabaab; key organizer of the 1998 bombings in Nairobi and Dar es-Salaam
	Sheikh Mukhtar Ali Robow 'Abu Mansur'	2012-	Deputy Emir, controls Bay and Bokool regions (Somalia)
	Sheikh Mohammed Fuad Qalaf 'Shongole'	2012-	Controls South-Central Somalia and Mogadishu
	Former Emir Ibrahim Haji Jama Mi'ad 'al-Afghani'	2012	Controls Puntland and Somaliland
	Sheikh Hassan al-Turki	2013	Controls Juba Valley
	Aden Hashi Ayro, led Al Shabaaba from	1997-2008	Ayro was authorized by Hassan Dahir Aweys to lead Al Shabaab as the military wing of Al Itihad Al Islamiya
	Ahmed Abdi Godane, AKA Mukhtar Abu Zubeyr.	2008-2014	During Godane's leadership, Al Shabaab pledged it allegiance to Al Qaeda in 2009 but was not accepted until 2012. He was killed by the US military in 2014
	Ahmad Umar Abu Ubaida, AKA Abu Ubaidah	2014 to-date	Abu Ubida was credited with purging the foreign fighters from Al Shabaab
	Mukhtar Robow Ali Abu Mansour.	2008-2017	Abu Mansour's whereabouts from 2008 to 2017, but in 2017 he was designated a global terrorist. He ran for the presidency of Baidoa, South Somalia, in 2018, the year the US withdrew a US$ five million bounty on his head.
Islamic State	Muhammad Ali Al-Jazouli	2014 to-date	Jazouli is the general coordinator of Al-Umma Al-Wahida or "One Nation", and the Emir of Da'esh in Sudan.
Islamic State	Sheikh Abdulqadir Mumin	2015 to-date	Da' esh leader (Amir)

	Mahad Moalim Jajab	2018 to-date	Da' esh deputy leader (or) Amir, was decleared a Specially Designated Global Terrorist by the United States Treasury Department, in February 2018. He was 'responsible for facilitating shipments of fighters and arms from Yemen to Somalia.
	Abdirahman Faahiye Isse Mohamud	2015 to-date	Sheikh Abdulqadir Mumin, organizer of suicide bombings.
	Abuu Yussuf	2018 to-date	US national, in charge of Foreign Affairs
	Abu Hafsa	2015 to-date	In charge of recruitment.
	Hamza Farey	2015 to-date	Head od Dawa
	Abdiqani Luqman	2015 to-date	Head of military operations
	Abdihakim Dhuqub	2015 to-date	Head of Da'esh in Bar region.
	Jafar Dabashan, Hamas (second name unknown)	2015 to-date	Military Commanders
	Fahad Aboole	2015 to-date	Head of Logistics
	Abdirashid (aka Mukhtar)	2015 to-date	Head of weapons procurement and has links with smuggling and pirate groups
	Isse Mohamed Yusuf (aka Isse Yulux).	Post 2015 (exact date not known)	Former leader of the Puntland Piracy Network; he officially renounced piracy and joined forces with the Puntland government in 2015

** Note that leadership of terrorist groups is fluid and constantly changing. The list provided here is indicative*

Source: Global Strategy Network (2018). The Islamic State in East Africa, page 21-22, available at https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Report_IS-in-East-Africa_October-2018-3.pdf, [accessed 25 November 2021]

2.3. Number of fighters, estimates 2018-2012

After its defeats in Iraq and Syria, Da'esh membership was estimated at more than 20,000, scattered all over the world. Some of these fighters were split between Syria and Iraq, while a small core was integrated into sympathetic rural and urban communities. Most Da'esh-affiliated fighters are in Afghanistan, South-East Asia, West Africa, Libya, Egypt/Sinai, Yemen, Somalia and the Sahel.

Da'esh financial networks have gone underground, often operating as regular business and front organizations. The security and finance bureaux and the immigration and logistics coordination office of Da'esh continue to function. Even after its defeat in 2018, Da'esh can still channel funds across borders, often through intermediate sympathizers and business partners.[26] The size of Da'esh's financial network is unknown, but it can be estimated in millions of USD, in the hands of trusted senior members in various parts of the globe. In 2021, Da'esh funds readily available to it, had declined from estimates in the hundreds of millions of dollars, to between $25 and $50 million, still leaving the group with significant resources. Terrorist finance facilitators in the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and neighbouring states continue to operate despite international efforts to locate and eliminate their activities through the pressure of sanctions.[27]

In the IGAD region, Somalia is designated by Da'esh as one of its four provinces in Africa (East Africa, the Sahel, North and Southern Africa). Al Shabaab is an Al Qaeda affiliate and is hostile to Da'esh for poaching its fighters. However, Da'esh has been weakened and has limited resources and capabilities. Despite its current constraints, it poses a significant threat in Somalia and Kenya.

2.4 Foreign Terrorist Fighters

Initially, some of Da'esh's most senior foreign terrorist fighters come from Sudan, while defectors mention the presence of Kenyans, Djiboutians, Ethiopians, Yemenis, and at least one Kuwaiti in the ranks as foreign terrorist fighters, even though some are likely of Somali origin. Members of the Somali diaspora, both in the West (the United Kingdom,Canada, Norway, and the Netherlands) and in Africa (especially Kenya but also Sudan) have also reportedly joined the group. And, indeed, by late 2018, observers noted that a new mini-wave

[26] UN, Security Council 2018.
[27] UN, Security Council 2021.

of IS foreign fighters seemed to be moving into northern Somalia. Led by a Syrian, the new cadre included Kenyans, Sudanese, Libyans, and, perhaps most interestingly, two Pakistanis.[28]

Da'esh recruits from Yemen or of Yemeni descent, joined Mumin soon after he broke away from Al Shabaab. There are many people on both sides of the Red Sea who have family ties on the other side, but numbers could not be confirmed. Some Sudanese and two Arabs were reported to have been killed in the drone strike near Buurgaleh in Southern Qandala district in early November 2017. Various other foreign terrorist fighters have been reported to have joined Mumin, including some from Somali diaspora communities in Canada, Kenya, The Netherlands, Norway, Sudan and the United Kingdom, and in a video released in December 2017, two fighters claimed to be from Ethiopia. Da'esh benefitted from the general dispersal of fighters from the battlefields of Syria and Iraq, as the central structures of the Islamic State began to collapse. Foreign Islamic State members reach Puntland through Libya and Sudan, or by crossing the Red Sea from Yemen. Human smuggling groups will take any cargo so long as it pays. Mumin has, no doubt, encouraged his smuggler contacts to direct migrant fighters to his bases. In addition, researchers in Ethiopia say that some ethnic Somalis have left the region to join radical groups in Libya, and that others who set off from home as economic migrants, have been recruited by extremists there. Some may therefore return, radicalised, networked, and with fighting skills.[29]

This sub-section illustrates that Da'esh networks are globally linked to Afghanistan, South-East Asia, West Africa, Libya, Egypt/Sinai, Yemen, Somalia and the Sahel. Da'esh has a prominent presence in Somalia, linking it up with Mozambique and the Central African Republic. The field study to Sudan sheds light on whether some individuals are fighting alongside Da'esh, similar to their involvement in Libya, as alluded to earlier.

[28] Warner 2021.

[29] Karr 2021.

2.4 Human and Financial Resources

2.4.1 Al Qaeda

This sub-section refers only to Al Qaeda resources and the estimated number of fighters in Sudan during the Bin Laden years. Bin Laden's business interests in Sudan began before he was expelled to Afghanistan (before he established Al Qaeda in 1998). His many businesses included a construction company which built the highway from Khartoum to Port Sudan, a new airport outside Port Sudan, repaved the 500-kilometre road from Khartoum north to Shendi and Atbara, and raised the height of the Rusayris hydroelectric dam. He also invested in large scale agriculture and cattle raising and, at one point, was given a monopoly to export maize, sunflowers, and sesame. In 1994, it was estimated that at least 5,000 mujahideen were trained in Shendi, north of Khartoum, often working on bin Laden's agricultural and construction projects.

Al-Qaeda's financial requirements, before the 11 September 2001 attacks, amounted to some 30 million US dollars annually.[30] This money was earmarked for carrying out attacks, the maintenance of its quasi-military apparatus, training and indoctrination of its members, contributions to the Taliban regime, but also for the occasional support of associated terrorist organizations. It is currently very difficult to make a reliable estimate of the operating cost of Al-Qaeda, as it now acts through a large number of cells and satellite terror groups which are more or less autonomous. The means these terrorist groups use to perpetrate attacks (vehicles, maps, components of explosives, surveillance material, etc.) are of relatively low cost compared to the damage they can cause. Certain estimates, whose accuracy may be open to question, provide an idea of the ratio of the approximate direct costs of certain

[30] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004), Monograph on Terrorist Financing, Staff Report to the Commission. Washington, DC, p.19. [http://govinfo.library.untedu/911/staff_statements]

attacks carried out by Al-Qaeda or its affiliates and the damage caused in terms of economic destruction and loss of human lives.[31]

Al-Qaeda has used a core of fundraisers to solicit money from a range of donors.[32] The main group of donors is based in the Gulf area, principally Saudi Arabia, but donors also exist in other parts of the world. Some of these donors have been fully aware of the final destination of their money; others were not. Many donors make their contributions to money collectors. Other funds come from corrupt employees of charitable organisations, in particular during the holy month of Ramadan. Fundraisers often also have access to imams in the Mosques and obtain part of zakat (obligatory almsgiving) donations to support the cause of radical Islam. Fundraisers have sometimes used legitimate charitable organisations; in other cases they have used front organisations and legitimate businesses to provide cover for their activities. This mix of fundraising methods has enabled Al-Qaeda to construct a considerable financial network throughout the Muslim world and in the foreign diaspora - allowing it to obtain the necessary money needed to operate.[33]

Since its inception, Al-Qaeda has made attempts to use charitable organisations to finance some of its activities. Charities enable a number of terrorist organizations to collect, transfer and distribute the necessary funds for the purposes of indoctrination, recruitment and training. This often also enables them to meet logistical and operational requirements. Charity is one of the fundamental principles of the Islamic religion, and all those who have a certain amount of money are obliged to pay zakat (2.5% annually of savings and assets). Apart from the obligatory zakat, the Koran and Islamic tradition also advocate Sadaqah (voluntary

[31] Excerpts from Juan Miguel del Cid Gómez on 'A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates'.
[32] United Nations (2005). Tenth Report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities. New York: United Nations, pages7-8.
[33] See also Mohamed Salih 2001, The Promise and Peril of Islamic Voluntarism.

contributions) to the most needy. Most Muslims pay these contributions to Islamic charities and to their mosque, which use them to finance a great variety of religious, humanitarian and social activities.

Al-Qaeda has used commercial companies to finance itself as well as to transfer funds. One such example is Barakaat, a network of companies which, in 2001, had a foothold in 40 countries. It operated telecommunications, construction, money remittance and cash exchange services from the United States and Somalia. For Bin Laden, Barakaat was a suitable instrument for making cash transfers; he invested in its telecommunications network. Barakaat acted as a source of financing and arranged cash transfers for him. Its owners channelled millions of dollars every year from the USA to Al-Qaeda or its associates. Barakaat also managed, invested and distributed funds for Al-Qaeda.

One of the most frequently used informal money transfer mechanisms is hawala ("transfer" in Arabic), a form of transporting finance from one place to another without the physical movement of money, and often also without a paper trail. Hawala's alternative money transfer systems are a cheap and rapid way of sending funds and making transactions. Originally they mainly served those who did not have a bank account, particularly in remote areas without a functioning financial system. What distinguishes hawala from other informal systems, are trust and a strong sense of honour, as this system often exists in extensive family networks based on regional and tribal connections of those who use it. The security, anonymity and versatility of hawala is also attractive for criminals and terrorists alike, who wish to move ilegally obtained funds or launder money raised by illegal activities.[34]

[34] Some parts of this section are informed by updated excerpts from Juan Miguel del Cid Gómez (2010) on A Financial Profile of the Terrorism of Al-Qaeda and its Affiliates.

As to the latest on Al Qaeda's financial resources; in his will Bin Laden mentioned that Usama Bin Muhammad 'Awadh Bin 'Abud Bin Laden had signed. It is estimated that Bin Laden left behind about 29 million dollars in Sudan. Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations have now gone underground under considerable pressure on their money-laundering activities, legal, administrative and institutional enforcement instruments and practices that have targeted them. Therefore, it is difficult, almost impossible for researchers with limited resources and access to global organizations dealing with money laundering and economic crimes to determine their financial resources.

2.4.2 Al Shabaab

Somalia: United States Africa Command (USAFRICOM) estimates that Al Shahab consists of 5,000–10,000 fighters across Somalia. Al Shabaab is led by a shura religious council, composed of senior leaders in charge of finance, intelligence, and public relations and appointed by its emir. In addition to its core leadership structure, the group operates multiple security organs, including the Amniyat (an intelligence agency with some policing responsibility) and Jeysh Al-Hisbah, Al Shabaab's police force. Amniyat, for example, leads counterintelligence efforts and purges Al Shahab fighters suspected of spying for state intelligence agencies. The organisation also administers a sophisticated administrative and financial bureaucracy capable of generating significant resources for the group. For example, it previously operated a system of mobile courts to deliver legal services to Somali citizens, with some people travelling into Al Shahab-controlled territory to access these courts, rather than Somali state courts. Despite international bans on Somali charcoal, the organisation generates significant revenue from taxing black market charcoal. One 2020 analysis from Mogadishu-based researchers, estimated that Al Shahab collected as much as $15 million in monthly revenue by taxing activities like home construction and customs duties on incoming shipping containers. This allows it the means to spend significant sums of money in supporting its military activities. The United Nations estimates that it spent approximately $21 million on personnel, weapons,

and intelligence in 2019, creating sustainable revenue streams by investing budget surpluses in sectors such as real estate. Inadequate governance in the country has allowed Al Shahab to operate unfettered in large safe havens throughout the southcentral region of the country. It has exploited this space by building a secure network of camps to train its fighters and establish a system of taxation and extortion, to raise funds. Further, by providing Somalis in these areas with basic governmental services, the organisation gained a great deal of goodwill and popular support, which bolstered its recruiting.

Al Shabab has allegedly received support from several African and Middle Eastern countries, most notably Eritrea. Although Eritrea has denied these allegations, the U.S. and Somali governments have accused Eritrea of supporting Al Shabab through weapons and funding. While the Eritrean government does not share Al Shabab's ideology, it is believed to have supported a militant organization to counter Ethiopian influence in Somalia. In 2017, the U.N. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea concluded that there was insufficient evidence to prove a link between Eritrea and Al Shabaab.[35]

The U.N. has also claimed that Djibouti, Iran, Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia have provided Al Shabaab with machine guns, missiles, and training. Hezbollah, an armed groups operating in Lebanon, is also believed to have given aid to it. This support from both states and militant organizations, violates the 1992 arms embargo imposed on Somalia.

Kenya: Underlying Al Shabaab attacks on Kenyan soil is the country's 700-kilometre porous border. The situation has been worsened by corruption, marginalization, and the poverty that lies at the root of youth unemployment, low school completion rates, and mushrooming

[35] UN, Security Council 2017. Extending Arms Embargoes on Somalia, Eritrea, Security Council Adopts Resolution 2385 (2017) by 11 votes in Favour, 4 Abstentions

slums in rural and urban areas. Many of these youth have fallen victim to radicalizing and recruitment agents. Within Kenya, the government continues to unearth and freeze accounts of terrorist financiers. In September 2020, it named nine terror financiers whose accounts and assets it froze. However, the matter was challenged and is still pending in court. They included Sheikh Guyo Gorsa Boru, Abdi Majit Adan Hassan, Mohammed Ali Abdi, Mukhtar Ibrahim Ali, Mire Abdullahi Elmi, Waleed Ahmed Zein, Halima Adan Ali and Nuseiba Mohammed Haji.[36]

The situation was further enabled by the existing financial infrastructure for transacting that did not require identification documents, for many years. Al Shabaab agents, like Violet Kemunto, who was a shop attendant at a mobile business, supplied phones and sim cards. They use the same to raise funds and enable operations.[37] Court documents about one of the conspirators in the Dusit D2 (Narobi) attack, showed transactions of Ksh.100 million (US$1 m) received from South Africa. Another suspect received 90,000 US$ via mobile phone, which he channelled to a terror assailant via 47 Sim cards.[38] In 2018, the police detained Waleed Ahmed Zein and Halima Adan Ali, for allegedly moving funds for ISIS.[39] The two ran a facilitation network linked to Kenya, Europe, the Middle East and East Africa. Halima received cash through Hawala, which she forwarded to ISIS fighters in Syria, Libya and the DRC.[40]

Other sources include contraband and illegal cross border trade. There is an apparent nexus between militants' attacks and smuggling activities. Some attacks on security personnel are carried out to disrupt their efforts to stop contraband, such as cooking oil, sugar, milk, and rice subjected to Al Shabaab taxation.[41] Criminal activities, such as kidnapping for ransom, are

[36] See Andrew Wasike : Kenya Names Terrorism Financiers , Freezes Assets. AA September 2, 2020
[37] Interview with a member of Kenya's Security community
[38] See Xinhua: News Analysis: Mobile Money on Spot as Kenya Links Service to Terrorism Funding January 30, 2019.
[39] See Kenya, Co. Ke. July 6, 2018.
[40] KBC, July 5, 2018
[41] Ombati C. Two Al Shabaab attackers shot dead after killing four people in Dadaab". Standard Media.

also used. In 2020, three Cuban medical doctors were kidnapped in the North-Eastern region.[42]

2.4.3 Da'esh

Da'esh's financial networks have gone underground, often operating as regular business and front organizations. The security and finance bureaux and the immigration and logistics coordination offices of Da'esh continue to function. Even after its defeat in 2018, Da'esh still channels funds across borders, often through intermediate sympathizers and business partners.[43] The size of its financial network is unknown, but it can be estimated in the millions (USD) in the hands of trusted senior members in various parts of the globe.

The most common source of Da'esh revenue was the taxation of businessmen by means of intimidation, in much the same way as Al-Shabaab. One citizen told investigative reporter Harun Maruf, that businesses are paying three taxes, Al-Shabaab taxes, Da'esh [IS] taxes, and the normal government taxes. As noted previously, IS–Somalia has also reportedly received finances from nearby Yemen, and is assumed to be involved in smuggling activities.[44]

In 2021, Da'esh funds readily available to it were estimated to have declined from hundreds of millions of dollars to between $25 million and $50 million, still leaving the group with significant resources. Terrorist finance facilitators in the Syrian Arab Republic, Iraq and neighbouring states continue to operate, despite international efforts to locate and eliminate their activities through the pressure of sanctions.[45]

[42] BBC News, April 12, 2019: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-47909070, [accessed 25 November 2021]
[43] UN Security Council, 2018.
[44] Warner 2021: 255
[45] UN, Security Council 2021.

The exact number of Sudanese ISIS members and combatants is not known. What is known, however, is that they are concentrated in the Sahel, Libya, Syria and Iraq. In 2021, the total number of Sudanese combatants in these countries and sleeper cells in Sudan were estimated at about 3000. Known and unknown ISIS combatants who returned to Sudan from the Sahel and the Middle East, are said to be in the tens rather than hundreds.

Global, regional, and Sudan-specific factors influence the return of Da'esh combatants to Sudan. First, globally, after the 2017 collapse of the Caliphate, ISIS lost some 95% of its territory in Syria and Iraq. It also lost its two biggest cities during the same year - Mosul, Iraq's second-largest city and Raqqa, the northern Syrian city, and its nominal capital.

The defeat of the Islamic State created a pool of IS ex-combatants looking for a new Jihadi career or repentance. Some Jihadi ex-combatants were eager to return to their home countries and start a new life. Others never abandoned their devotion to the creation of an Islamic State somewhere else.

Regionally, Sudan Jihadist activities straddled the Sahel and the Horn of Africa, making it central to influencing and being influenced by extremist Jihadist organizations such as Boko Haram, an ISIS-affiliate in the Sahel and ISIS Province in Somalia, which serves the Horn of Africa, including Sudan. Sudan's religious education infrastructure (Islamic University in Omdurman; International University in Khartoum) and many other private institutions, have attracted students from all over the world, including IGAD Member States.

Nationally, Sudan's open-door, visa-free policy for Arab-Muslims attracted the leaders, fire-brand preachers and disciples from several Jihadist organizations, including Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab, Da'esh, Hamas. These Jihadist organizations committed terror attacks that traversed several Sudanese regional states.

Regionally, Jihadi organizations such as Al Qaeda, groups that were excommunicated, and Da'esh that was operational during the Al-Bashir era, have not disappeared. They have shown their presence in the latest attacks on the Sudanese Prime Minister and in October 2021, in the Jabra neighborhood in Khartoum.

3. Ideology, Objectives and Strategy

3.1 Al Qaeda

Al Qaeda has four objectives in calling Muslims to commit to Jihad against the West:

1) Ending the United States presence in the Middle East. It describes the presence of the US in the Middle East (Saudi Arabia) as a desecration of the holy land of Islam;
2) Destroying Israel, which it portrays as a Western colonial outpost;
3) Reorienting the Jihadist movement by converting Muslims to its Salafi-Jihadist worldview; and
4) Opposing apostate regimes in the Muslim World, indicating that the Muslim leaders are not true Muslims and thus must be overthrown and replaced by the Khalifate.[46]

Although Al Qaeda adheres to a radical fundamentalist interpretation of Islam, its strategic orientation is pragmatic and flexible. It can be implemented without deviating from its core values and strategic objectives. Five strategic pillars inform Al Qaeda's strategy:

a. The most cherished and practically implemented strategy is attrition, aimed at exhausting or what it refers to as 'bleeding the enemy'. Al Qaeda leadership, operatives and sleeper cells can take along time to attack their targets. For example, planning 9/11 took many years, and included training pilots, some in the USA.
b. Willingness to die for the cause described in the Al Qaeda objectives subsections.
c. Al Qaeda seeks publicity and knows that warzone attacks do not generate publicity and impact, as much as attacks in seemingly stable locations. Attacking New York, London, Madrid, Riyadh, or Nairobi would generate its desired level of global publicity.
d. Attacking the infrastructure associated with creating national wealth, in order to achieve the maximum harm to the national economy.

[46] Byman, 2015.

e. Penetrating and supporting local Islamist groups whose religious posture is amenable to Al Qaeda's broadest goals, allowing them to use their territory and networks for training and rear support.

3.2 Da'esh

Siebert et al. (2016: 32) gleaned Da'esh's objectives and strategy from its published documents, speeches and proclamations, and interviews with its leaders. Matrix 1 (below) shows how elaborate Da'esh's objectives and strategic aims were. These are entwined and reinforcing, making complex linkages between the two. Essentially, Da'esh endeavored to cascade objectives and strategy to penetrate society and shape its recruits at an early age, by making the teaching of true Islam to children, one of its strategic objectives.

The second layer of its strategic objectives is the followers: they aim to radicalize them, give meaning to their lives, increase their numbers and indoctrinate them to expand Sunni, by using Jihad to stop the Shia brand of Islam. The third layer of Da'esh's strategic objectives is to displace the rules and control Iraq, Syria and the Lavant. The fourth strategic objective is global, aiming to purge the world of anti-Islamic forces; it aims to eliminate foreign agents, tyrants, and Jews. Further, Da'esh objectives call for the spread of fanaticism and terror and the creation of a unique brand of ruthlessness, purity and notoriety.

Da'esh's terror acts and system of rule, provide a chilling image of its ideological orientation and gruesome deeds.

Table 3:1: Da'esh Leaders' Objectives Derived From Expert Interviews

Establish a Caliphate in Iraq and the Levant	**Expand Islam and Sharia Law Worldwide**	**Recreate the Power and Glory of (Sunna) Islam**

Eliminate Current rulers in Iraq and the Levant	Function as a state and provide services	Purge the world of anti-Islamic forces	Give meaning to the lives of Sunnis	Implement a pure and strict version of Islam
Occupy, defend, and expand territory	Provide internal security, semblance of order	Create a brand and notoriety as ruthless and pure	Stop Shiia violence and discrimination	Be recognized as the leader of the Jihad
Provide military leadership and resources	Secure resources and supply lines	Kill, frighten, and convert infidels	Radicalize followers	Teach the children true Islam
Increase numbers of fighters and followers	Fight decadency and corruption	Spread fanaticism and terror		
Eliminate foreign agents, tyrants, and Jews	Settle grievances, redistribute wealth			
	Generate revenue			

Source: Siebert et al. 2016: 32.

Da'esh's sixth objective is to maintain itself as an organization, including revenue generation and the securing of resources and supply lines in order to provide amenities for its fighters and the population in the regions under its control.

Da'esh did not abandon its strategic objectives after its defeat and the dawning of the post-Caliphate era. Its reliance on a decentralized structure of provinces operating across the world, shows that it is a pragmatic organization trying to maximize its operations with far fewer resources and a fixed territory that it can call a state. However, Da'esh is still a dangerous radical organization that poses serious security threats and can cause considerable harm.

3.3 Al Shabaab

Al Shabaab's strategy is mediated by flexibility and pragmatism. Dynamics on the ground inform this. It can switch from traditional guerrilla tactics to conventional tactics, or a

combination of both, with variants of terrorism. It seeks to maximize the variables of time, space and constructed cause. Al Shabaab seeks to maximize time by a strategy of attrition, in order to drain enemy resources and willpower. Like its base parent, Al Qaeda, Al Shabaab continues to build cells that maximize on time to achieve the element of surprise.[47] In addition to Al Shabaab, there are Da'esh networks. Even though several were quickly disrupted, they remain a potentially serious threat, given their adherents' desire for spectacular and heavy-casualty events.

3.3.1. Summary of Da'esh and international terrorists' ideological orientation and aims

Table 3.2: Da'esh and International Terrorists' Ideological Orientation and Aims

Group:	Ideological orientation:	Aims:
ADF	Tabliq doctrine; puritanical salaf Islamic doctrine; political Islam	To overthrow the government of Uganda To establish a sharia-based government
Al-Shabaab	Jihadist doctrine of punishment against "enemies of Islam."	Overthrow the Federal Government of Somalia; Banish African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM) out of Somalia
Islamic State	Teaches strict interpretation of Sharia Law	To create an Islamic state called a caliphate across Iraq, Syria and beyond.
LRA	Christian radical fundamentalism	To overthrow the government of Uganda To establish the ten commandments

3.4 History of Attacks, motives, targets and tactics

3.4.1 Sudan

Al-Qaeda operatives cooperated with the Egyptian militant, El-Gamaa al-Islamiyya (GAI). They travelled from Sudan to Somalia to train anti-US fighters and are believed to have played a

[47] See Katumanga Musambayi. The Political Economy of Insurge-Terrorism and "Covart" in Kenya and Juba Borderlands." The African Review. Vol 44, No 2 December 2017p 136-171

role in the battle in Mogadishu that downed two US Black Hawk helicopters in October 1993 - leading to the death of 18 US servicemen.[48]

Sudan was found liable for its role in planning and executing Al- Qaeda's 1998 twin embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya (Matthew B. Ridgway Center 2005 and Ploch 2010). These bombings killed 224 people (among them, 12 Americans), -and wounded thousands more. Specifically, 2011 court records from *James Owens et al. vs the Republic of Sudan,* indicate that the "Sudanese intelligence service enabled Al-Qaeda operative, L'Houssaine Kherchtou, to smuggle US$10,000 from Sudan to Kenya". The *Patterns of Global Terrorism 1998* report noted: "Sudan continued to serve as a meeting place, haven and training hub for several international terrorist groups, particularly Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization.[49]

The extent of Sudan's support to Al Qaeda was clearly described during the 2007 trial of *Olivia Rux vs the Republic of Sudan*, a suit filed by the family members of the US sailors killed in the 12 October 2000 *USS Cole* bombing. The lawsuit alleged that Sudan knowingly and willfully provided Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda with material support for the attack. During the hearings, it emerged that Bin Laden had assisted Sudan by building the airport near Port Sudan on the Red Sea and the road connecting the airport to Khartoum.[50]

Table 3.3 Major Terrorist Attacks in Sudan

Year	Terrorist organization, with links to the Middle East	Casualties
Abu Guta attack, 1988	Ma'ruf Adlan, the Emir of Jama'at Al-Takfir in Al-Jazirah Province. It attacked the Sufi sheikhs of the Sulimania sect.	NA
Campo 10 attack, 1993	Armed Islamic Front (Al Jabha al-Wataniya al-Musalaha)	20 members of the organization killed

[48] Schanzer 2012.
[49] US, Supreme Court 2018.
[50] US, District Court, Virginia 2007.

Al Qaeda attack of Ansar Al-Sunna Mosque, 1994	Al Qaeda	16 worshipers killed
Al-Jarafa Mosque attack, Omdurman, 2000	Abu-Bakr Al-Siddiq Mosque in the Al-Jarafa neighbourhood was attacked	22 worshippers killed
Al-Salama Jihadist Cell Explosives, 2007	Carried out by 25-35 young-men trained in Somalia and Iraq	Apprehended before setting-off the explosives
US Diplomat and his Sudanese driver assassinated, 2008	The three assailants were members of an Al Qaeda cell, operating from Khartoum	John Granville, an American Diplomat and Abdul Rahman Abbas, his Sudanese driver killed. One of the assailants, Muhannad Osman Yusuf, was killed while he was fighting in Somalia
Dindir cell, or Rijalun haul-a-Rasoul'2012	Rijalun haul-a-Rasoul', literally translated 'men around the Prophet' - consists of 60 young men who established a training camp at the Dinder game reserve. The camp was used for military training and preparing Da'esh fighters to fight in Somalia, Mali, Syria and Iraq.	27 killed, including two security offices; many more wounded.
March 2019	Da'esh militants were suspected to be part of an assassination attempt on Abdalla Hamdok, Sudan's Prime Minister.	No causalities.
September 2021	Da'esh-linked militants	Five Sudan intelligence officers, 11 foreign terrorists from different nationalities" were killed in the raid, while four foreign terrorists escaped.
5 October 2021	Da'esh-linked militants	Four suspected Islamic State-linked militants and one Sudanese Security Forces member, were killed.

The terrorist attacks presented here reveal that some Sudanese self-motivated Jihadist activists are connected with Da'esh, Al Shabaab, Al Qaeda, and a host of Middle East terrorist groups. Terrorist activities post Al Bashir, are dominated by Da'esh and its relationship with the Sudan-Chad-Libya triangle. In all cases, Sudanese Muslims have not been ready to join Da'esh, thus bringing Da'esh militancy and Sudanese Islamic tolerance into conflict. The

attacks on mainstream popular Islam sects (Tariqas) and teachings, cost them the sympathy of Sudanese society. They were often reported to the police because they harassed neighbours. For example, they ordered women to wear Burka and cover their heads, legs and hands. They also preached militant sermons in mosques and public spaces.

3.4.2 Kenya

A convergence of open sources and aggregatation of earlier security community data of attacks in Kenya between 2011 and 2020, estimates the attacks at 214 with 717 fatalities. These have largely been executed using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), grenades and light arms. Motor Vehicle Improvised Explosive Devices (MVIEDs) have been used against Kenyan units in Somalia.

Table 3.4: Summary of Al Shabaab and Affiliate Terrorist Attacks in Kenya 2011-2020

Year	Location	Attacks	Deaths
2020	Mandera Wajiir Garissa Lamu	29 8 23 9	122
	Total	**69**	**122**
2019	Nairobi	1	21
	Wajir	3	30
	Mandera	1	1
	Garissa	1	11
	Total	**6**	**63**
2018	Wajir	1	3
	Mandera	1	10
	Garissa	2	7
	Lamu	1	8
	Total	**5**	**28**
2017	Mandera	4	30
	Lamu	3	20
	Total	**7**	**50**
2016	Kwale	2	4
	Mandera	4	29
	Mombasa	1	3
	Total	**7**	**36**

2015	Garissa	1	147
	Mandera	1	11
	Lamu	2	19
	Total	**4**	**177**
2014	Nairobi	7	23
	Mombasa	2	6
	Total	**9**	**29**
2013	Garissa	25	28
	Mandera	3	0
	Wajir	4	4
	Nairobi	4	79
	Mombasa	1	0
	Total	**37**	**111**
2012	Garissa	9	26
	Wajir	7	10
	Mandera	9	12
	Nairobi	13	26
	Mombasa	7	10
	Total	**45**	**84**
2011	Lamu	3	1
	Mandera	5	7
	Nairobi	2	1
	Wajir	3	0
	Garissa	12	8
Total		**25**	**17**
Grand Total		**214**	**717**

On 22 March 2019, a few weeks after the Dusit D2 attack in Kenya, KDF's special forces units from 30SF, killed the chief of Al Shabaab's Kenyan operations., Ahmad Imaan Ali, *aka* Abu Zinira, in Buale in Jubaland. An estimated 40 others died with him. He was on the list of five most wanted terrorists, with a Ksh 332 million reward on their heads. Others on the list included, Abdulrahaman Mohamad *alias* Gamadere, *alias* Dulyadeen, *alias* Thulyadein, *alias* Kuno, Abdilahi Banatu, Thomas Evans and Abdulrahaman Kufungwa.[51] Kufungwa later became a core member of Jaysh Ayman (an Al-Shabaab unit). The Jayish Ayman fighters were mainly drawn from East Africa mainly from Swahili speaking countries. Gamadare, on the

[51] See Nyambega Gisesa. How elite Unit Killed Kenya's most wanted Terror Kingpin. The Standard Thursday 14, October 201 p6-7

other hand, was the mastermind of the attack on Garissa University that occasioned 147 deaths. He died at the hands of the Somali Special Forces. Banatu was among those behind the Mpeketoni attacks in 2014, that resulted in the death of 60 people. He was killed in the Boni forest.[52]

For Kenya, terrorism remains a major national security threat, with most of the incidents largely prevalent in the country's North Eastern and Coastal regions. Al Shabaab affiliates and auxiliaries continue to target security officers and Kenyans not local to these regions, who are working in the communications infrastructure sector. One hundred and two incidents were recorded by the police in 2019, and they accounted for 59 deaths, 62 injuries and three kidnappings.[53] While in 2015, 1000[54] Kenyan elements were estimated to have been killed, some security actors now place this number between 300 and 500.[55] Notwithstanding the demise of such large numbers, many others are still inclined to carry out suicide missions, and this remains an issue of concern.

In conceiving of the northeastern region as a contiguous territory with the regions that it occupies in Somalia, Al-Shabaab seeks to drive home its narrative that a large part of Kenya is occupied Muslim territory that it seeks to liberate. It seeks to disperse in space, hoping to achieve a corresponding dispersal of Kenyan security forces after it. The objective is to engender a reactive dispersal of Kenyan security forces within and without Kenya, leading to their eventual weakening, exhaustion, and elimination.[56] This underpins the calibration of Al

[52] See Nyambega Gisesa. How elite Unit Killed Kenya's most wanted Terror Kingpin. The Standard Thursday 14, October 201 p6-7
[53] Interview with a Senior Strategic Security Community Actor. October 2021
[54] See Katrina Manson: Kenyan Crackdown on Al Shabaab Militants Threaten to Backfire. EastAfrican Correspondent. Financial Times. April 29,2015
[55] Discussions with a member of the Kenyan Security Community . November 2021
[56] See Katumanga Musambayi. The Political Economy of Insurge-Terrorism and "Covart" in Kenya and Juba Borderlands." The African Review. Vol 44, No 2 December 2017p 136-171

Shabaab's actions with its objectives by deploying insurgency-terrorism and terror insurgency from other countries, into Kenya.

Instability caused by divisions can destabilize the entire Eastern Africa, and engender an environment for recruitmentment from outside Kenya to spread. Jayshi Ayman targets Kenya's emerging geo-strategic and economic infrastructure. Hitting these economic and human assets is meant to spread the idea that the war and its destructive costs is incapacitating the state, its institutions and most of all, eroding territorial integrity, while affirming the idea of a caliphate as a substitute to it.

The senior leaders decide attacks at a strategic level, providing broad guidelines on the location of choice, targets and leadership; the cell executes these. The decision is followed by initial deployment and planning, a surveillance process that includes target selection and information gathering. Purchase and transportation of weapons and explosives is followed by a final target selection. Instead of escape and evasion, most major attacks seek martyrdom in order to ensure a maximum kill. Notably, the inclination to entrust these operations to non-Somali elements increases Al Shabaab's leaders' confidence in their strategic and tactical utility.

Its efforts to expand the instability belt and engulf the entire Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia-Transport (LAPSSET) corridor, by opening up recruitment and supply lines through Marsabit, Isiolo and Nairobi, remain largely contained. It is notable that since 2013, at least 10 youth have been recruited to Al Shabaab from Isiolo. Others were recruited in Nyeri, Marsabit and Kiambu.[57]

[57] Interview with a member of the Kenyan security community, November 2021. See also Duncan Miriri: Spreading the Net: Somali Islamists now target Kenyan recruits, May 17, 2019, Emerging Markets. It is notable that Samuel (Farouk) Gichungi, who led the Dusit D2 attack, was from Nyeri, while his counterpart Erick Kinyanjui, was from Kiambu.

In 2018, the police intercepted an Amniyaat terror cell, killed one of its operatives and arrested two others in Merti Isiolo County. The terrorists sought to use a Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive (VBIED) rigged with explosives assembled in El Adde, Somalia; however the intercepted VBIED's ultimate destination remains unspecified. Five terrorists were transported in a vehicle with registration KBM 200D. They also had five AK 47s, 36 fully loaded magazines, 30 rounds and 36 unprimed grenades, 18 IEDs, and three military knives.[58] Six hours later, the military patrol killed three terrorists and recovered 3 AK 47s with 236 bullets. Another was killed in an IED explosion that he attempted to plant on the road, 3 kilometres from Sarira.[59] This desire remains important for various reasons. Destabilizing the Marsabit-Isiolo region would have expanded identity instability into Southern Ethiopia and South Sudan, consolidating the middle trans-Saharan arch of instability. It would also have enabled the destabilization of Kenya's heartland, affecting strategic power plants and other economic enablers. It was quickly neutralized.

Al Shabaab has also continued to execute attacks in the counties of Mandera and Wajir in the North Eastern Region. Its affiliates and auxiliaries have deployed IEDs, small arms and light weapons to attack socio-economic, and political and security infrastructure in education, health, economic, transport and communication networks. As President Kenyatta observed, "All these were aimed at creating an illusion of dominance and fear among the Kenyan populace, besides frustrating government development programs and services".[60] In addition, attacks are also meant to incite and broadcast polarities, frustration and a sense of exclusion. These planned attacks (above) were aimed at disrupting these services, and consequently enabling the erosion of sovereignty, legitimacy and territorial integrity, before

[58] The two arrested terrorists were Abdimajit Hassan Adan (24), and Mohammed Nane (23). An ID of Jirma Huka Galgalo, was also found. See: Kenya Police foil Major Terror Attack, The East African, Sunday 18, 2018.
[59] The two arrested terrorists were Abdimajit Hassan Adan (24), and Mohammed Nane (23). An ID of Jirma Huka Galgalo was also found. See: Kenya Police Foil Major Terror Attack, The East African, Sunday 18, 2018.
[60] Nation TV, Prime News, "Kenya foiled terror attacks but the war is far from won", Friday 18 December 2020.

Al Shabaab steps in to offer alternatives. Destruction of education infrastructure is meant to create future recruits, and opportunities for Al Shabaab and its Al-Hijra affiliates, to emerge as the alternative provider of these services.

Al Shabaab effectively utilized and deployed both criminal violence and returnees, in the South Coastal part of Kwale. Here, violence directed at village elders and religious leaders assumed to have collaborated with the government, resulted in assassinations. Security agents were also targeted. Despite this, efforts at dismantling cells have been largely successful, according to the President. Parallel to this are threats of radicalization and recruitment of Nairobi, Mombasa and Lamu youth. They continue to target vulnerable youth within learning institutions, Mosques and Madrassa, before trafficking them into Somalia for training by militants.[61] This recruitment has also been noted in correctional facilities. Terrorists in Somalia continue to deploy social and family networks to persuade their friends in Kenya to join them.

Three trends can be discerned here. The first is the hundreds of youth that joined Al Qaeda and Al Shabaab through the radicalization efforts of Muslim clerics, Abud Rogo and Makaburi. The second comes from those who joined through efforts of Iman Ali and the MYC. The third trend is characterized by those recruited from academia. To these, we can add recruitment in correctional units, and those that continue to self-radicalize through online recruitment sites. The Iman group seems to have been motivated by the promise of purpose and an alternative life to their marginalization and deprivation. There is also the element of peer group influence and a desire to effect change.

[61] President Uhuru Kenyatta, Annual Report to Parliament on the State of National Security, March, 2020, Government Printers, Nairobi 2020, page 3

Over time, it has become apparent that women play a crucial role in recruitment, logistical and financial support conduits in Coastal and North Eastern counties. They equally act as spies and masterminds behind attacks. Others have acted as conveners of terror cells. Underlying this are several factors: ideological resonance with their religious inclinations; financial benefits; association, intimidation/coercion, and deception. These factors have convinced some about the need to fight against what is conceived as 'Christian marginalization'.[62]

ISIS has largely attracted tertiary level youth. Most of them were attracted to cash for education, others by the Jihad success attributed to ISIS. These included Abu Fida's associates - Farah Dagane Hassan and Hiishi Ahmed Ali – who fled to Libya to avoid arrest. They studied medicine at Kampala International University. In this network was Dr Abudallah Adulgani Allin (arrested in October 2016) and two interns at Malindi Hospital, Shukri Mohammed Yerrow and Abdulrazaak Abdinuur. The Inspector-General of police pointed to a country-wide "terror network" linked to ISIS and led by Mohamed Abdi Ali. Police were able to capture materials for making IEDs, homemade bombs, as well as bows and poisoned arrows, noting,[63] "These suspects were planning a large-scale terror attack akin to the Westgate Mall attack with intentions of killing innocent Kenyans".[64] Police also noted that at least 20 Kenyans had travelled to join ISIS in Libya, Somalia and Syria.[65]

In December 2015, for example a bus was attacked en route from Nairobi to Mandera in North Eastern Kenya. The disaster was averted when Muslim passengers went out of their way to protect their Christian countrymen. The police attributed the attack to the militants who had defected to Al-Shabaab. According to the Inspector General of Police, ISIS and Al

[62] See Fathima Azimiya Badurdeen: The Conversation: Why We did it. The Kenyan Women and Girls Who Joined Al Shabaab. February 21, 2021.
[63] ISIS Makes Inroads into Kenya. www.news 24.com, 30 June 2016.
[64] Robyn Kriel and Briana Dugan. Kenyan Authorities Claim to have Foiled a Potential Bio-Terror Attack. CNN May 4, 2016.
[65] Robyn Kriel and Briana Dugan. Kenyan Authorities Claim to have Foiled a Potential Bio-Terror Attack. CNN May 4, 2016.

Shabaab were competing to spread the international Jihad agenda. In the long run, the well-financed and brutal ISIS's entry into the region could herald more and better-coordinated attacks in Kenya.[66]

Some of the radicalization and recruitment networks of Da'esh were uncovered in prison. It is notable that from here, operational contacts were established with ISIS, with a supporting nexus to a local network cell that was female based. This cell coordinated recruitment and logistical support for travel to Syria.[67] Social media and the Internet remain core to recruitment and actual training of 'lone wolves' seeking to join.

3.4.3 Somalia

Al Shabaab's first attack after its establishment in 2006, took place in Mogadishu in March 2007 (73 killed), which was the fifth largest attack, compared with 2017 (512 killed), 2016, (141 killed), 2010 (85 killed), 2020 (82 killed), and the 2010 second attack (74 killed).

Year	Name of the terrorist organization	Casualty
March 26, 2007	Al Shabaab, against Ethiopia soldiers in Mogadishu	73 killed, unknown wounded
October 29, 2008	Al Shabaab, targeted UN and government buildings in Hargeisa and Bosasso	More than 29 killed, and 36 wounded
July 11, 2010	Al Shabaab, suicide bombings in Kampala, Uganda.	More than 74 killed and 85+ wounded
April 14, 2013	Al Shabaab bombed a convoy of Turkish aid workers.	More than 30 killed, unknown number wounded
September 21, 2013	Al Shabaab attacked Westgate Mall in Nairobi, Kenya, with a car bomb before entering the	68 killed, and 175 wounded

[66] See Sirkku Hellstein: Radicalization and Terrorist Recruitment Among Kenya's Youth. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet. Policy Note no1, 2016

[67] Jail-based recruitment had been evolving since. See His Excellency, Hon Uhuru Kenyatta: Annual Report to Parliament on the State of National Security, March, 2020, Government Printers, Nairobi 2020, page 3.

	compound to engage in a gunfight with guards.	
February 21, 2014:	Al Shabaab attacked Villa Somalia, the presidential palace	More than 14 killed, unknown wounded
June 16, 2014	Al Shabaab attacked several targets in the Kenyan town of Mpeketoni	More than 49 killed, and unknown number of people wounded.
November 22, 2014	Al Shabaab militants attacked a bus traveling from Kenya's Mandera district	28 killed, and unknown number of people wounded
October 7, 2015	Al Shabaab militants ambushed a car carrying two passengers, killing both.	Two killed
January 15, 2016	Al Shabaab militants attacked an AMISOM base in el-Ade, Somali	141 killed, and unknown number of people wounded
October 14, 2017	Al Shabaab exploded two truck bombs in busy districts of Mogadishu.	512 killed, 312 wounded, 62 missing
April 1, 2018	Al Shabaab militants attacked a base of Ugandan peacekeeping forces in the town of Bulamarer.	46 killed
November 9, 2018	Al Shabaab, on the headquarters of Somalia's Criminal Investigations Department and the Sahafi Hotel	53 killed and unknown number of people wounded
January 15, 2019	Al Shabaab's devastating attack on an AMISOM base in Kenya	21 killed, and unknown number of people wounded
January 8, 2020	Deadly Attacks Signal Resurgence.	82 killed and close to 150 were injured.
September 2021	Mogadishu at teashop made of corrugated tin. An explosive vest was detonated.	11 killed.
September 2021	Attack on convoy of senior police officials in the Somali capital	Nine killed and eight wounded.

Evidently, there is no clear pattern to indicate that Al Shabaab's potency is decreasing or its staying power is diminishing. Its tactic is to attack whenever the opportunity exists. This lack

of pattern makes it very difficult for counterterrorism agencies to predict their next move or build reliable attack scenarios. Essentially, it can be safely concluded that Al Shabaab is not yet an expend force and that counterterrorism efforts should be intensified rather than otherwise.

3.4.4 Uganda

The ADF has been operational for over 26 years, has killed more than 1,000 people, including an estimated 80 who were burnt to death in June 1998, when they attacked Kichwamba Technical College in Kabarole. They have also displaced close to 200,000 people. They have carried out numerous attacks in Uganda and DR Congo. In recent times, the 2021 attempted assassination of Gen. Katumba Wamala in the early morning, brought them back to the forefront of terrorism. Some of their recent high-profile killings include that of Maj Muhammad Kiggundu in Masanafu, Kampala, on November 26, 2016; former police spokesperson Andrew Felix Kaweesi in Kulumbiro, on the outskirts of Kampala, on March 17, 2017; Assistant Director of Public Prosecution Joan Kagezi on March 30, 2015; and at least seven Muslim clerics. All of these killings have been blamed on the ADF (*Daily Monitor*).

The most prominent attack was the Kichwamba attack in 1988, where they attacked the vocational institute in order to get human resources. Earlier that year, they attacked Kagwando prison in Kasese, to get the recruits and guns used on Kichwamba. Other attacks were on some police posts in Kasese in the mountain areas, during which they managed to get some guns. In Bundibugyo, they attacked small police stations to get personnel. A total of three or four people were killed in mountain ranges, plus four guns were taken. Intelligence shows that the ADF killed the prominent Sheikh 'Doktur', in Mayuge district, because he was promoting a moderate ideology, discouraging their violent methods and recruiting youth in the area. This sheikh was trying to reach out to every family to dissuade their children from joining. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, there were several bombings in pubs and drinking places around Kampala and its suburbs. The ADF was responsible for explosions in five urban

restaurants and bars, which killed seven people. Intelligence sources indicate that they are still kidnapping for ransom in Beni and Ituri areas of DR Congo. They are also abducting young men and recruiting them into their ranks.

However, the ADF appears to have changed methods and increased their footprint using more versatile cells. There was a particular cell of ADF operating within the Usafi mosque in Uganda. This one specialized in kidnappings to raise money for their operations. For instance, they kidnapped a girl and later a woman called Suzan Magara, and demanded a ransom. They kidnap children of the wealthy to mobilize funds. In this case, they demanded 200,000 US dollars, which they received. They kept her for one week, demanding the money, and there was a lot of back and forth before the money was released. They didn't want to kill the girl, but the girl got familiar with the lady, a terrorist cell member, keeping her. They feared that if the girl were released alive, she would easily identify that place and the lady keeping her, leading to their arrest. The killed her to cover their tracks.

The 200,000 dollars that they received was not used on any luxury. The money was given to them in Ugandan currency, and amounted to over 700 million Ugandan Shillings. They used it to acquire land in Bukiwe (after Nkonkonjeru; about 10 acres) and started constructing madrasa. These activities were supposed to help them train young children to join ADF. The land neighboured the lake shore, and by the time of Jamil Mukulu's arrest, they had started building structures, including dormitories and administrative buildings. They also bought other land, about five acres, in Luwero (between Ssemuto and Kapeeka). At the time that the Usafi ADF cell was bust, they were building another madrasa and had reserved the rest as a burial ground (cemetery) for their members. They had also bought vehicles to help them with mobility and cargo trucks to help generate income. They had four cargo trucks that people would hire for construction work, to finance ADF operations. Some money was used to set up a make-shift health centre and hire skilled medical workers to treat their trainees. They bought medical supplies, ready to be transported to Congo, including ARVS, antimalarials, etc.

Fortunately, that cell was busted and with Sheikh Faisal and his wife arrested in Mozambique, the cell crumbled. Before they were busted, Sheikh Faisal had already done training in the ISC camp in Cabo Delgado. He laid down the plans for their operation. He also left behind another Imam in charge, who master-minded the kidnapping mission, which resulted in the killing of that girl. The Imam was reported to have fled to Mozambique and is believed to be there still. The cell built up in the Usafi car park in Kampala has been neutralized, and the Usafi mosque is no longer being used. The government confiscated all their vehicles, land, and properties. They were very disciplined in writing summaries of what they bought with the money; it was used for investment to reap the rewards in the future.

Below is a tabulated presentation of the most recent attacks carried out by Uganda's most notorious terror groups. Note that the list is not exhaustive.

Summary of Reecnt Major Attacks by Terror Groups in Uganda: The ADF has carried out numerous attacks in Uganda. Some of their recent terror attacks include the following:

- On 17th November 2021, ADF attacked a Police patrol vehicle in Nyamunuka, Kasese District, injuring an officer;
- On 16th November 2021, ADF carried out two (2) suicide attacks in Kampala, targeting the Central Police Station (CPS) and the Parliamentary building, during which one (1) person was killed as well as two (2) suicide bombers - thirty-three (33) other innocent civilians were injured;
- On 25th October 2021, ADF conducted a suicide attack on a passenger bus (Shift Bus) at Lungala, along Kampala-Masaka Highway, during which the suicide bomber died and several passengers were injured;
- On 23rd October 2021, ADF attacked a busy public pub known as Digida Bar in Komamboga, a Kampala suburb, killing a civilian and injuring several others;

- On 26th August 2021, security foiled an attempted terror attack at the burial of the late Deputy Inspector General of Police, who also served as an AMISOM Contingent Commander, Gen. Paul Lokech, in Pader District. The burial attracted thousands of mourners, including high profile Government officials, and the former President of Somalia, Sharif Sheikh Ahmed;
- On 1st June 2021, ADF conducted an assassination attempt on Uganda's Minister of Works and Transport and former Chief of Defence Forces (CDF), Gen. Katumba Wamala, along Kisota road in Kampala, killing his daughter and driver;

Between 2011 and 2017, ADF assassinated twelve (12) moderate sheikhs and other prominent Government officials including: former Police Spokesperson, Andrew Felix Kaweesi in Kulumbiro, on the outskirts of Kampala (March 17, 2017); Assistant Superintendent of Police (ASP) Muhammad Kirumira; and the Assistant Director of Public Prosecution, Joan Kagezi (March 30, 2015), among others.

Other groups that have carried out terror attacks against Uganda's interests include:

- Al Shabab (Somalia) that carried the July 2010 suicide attacks in Kampala, during which seventy-four (74) people were killed and eighty-five (85) others injured. Al Shabab has also continued to carry out attacks against the UPDF AMISOM Contingent in Somalia;
- The Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) was active between 1988 and 2010, during which time they committed atrocities against civilians, especially in Acholi, Lango and Teso sub-regions of Uganda;
- Currently, the group is degraded and remnants are scattered along the North Eastern part of DRC and Eastern CAR, with no clear leadership structure. The group attacks villages to loot food items for survival. They are also engaged in poaching wild animals in Garamba National Park.

As can be seen by the material presented in this section, the tactics used by the international terrorists networks are diverse and have become increasingly sophisticated, combing conventional and more recent methods. The common conventional tactics used by terrorists include hijackings, beheadings, kidnappings, suicide bombings, bombings, assassinations, armed assaults, extortion, and hostage-taking. Most recently, firing from motorcycles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) or drones, Improvised Explosive Devices (IED), and Improvised Explosive Devices (MVIED) have been employed. The last two tactics are used by Al Shabaab.

4. IGAD Member States' Response

4.1 Institutions, Legal and Administrative Framework for Countering Terrorism

Djibouti has robust counterterrorism law enforcement, security, intelligence, as well as legal and administrative frameworks, for combating terrorism. In 2019, the Djibouti Ministry of Justice created a national commission of experts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Center of Excellence for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (ICEPCVE), that were tasked with finalizing the work on the Djibouti national strategy to combat violent extremism. Although there is no evidence to suggest that Da'esh is active in spreading extremism and radicalization or poses an imminent security threat to Djibouti, complacency should be avoided and vigilance maintained. Given the geopolitical importance of Djibouti, it should be given privileged access to the services provided by the IGAD ICEPCVE.

The Ethiopian National Defence Force, the Ethiopian Federal Police (EFP), Ethiopian intelligence, and Regional Special Police, operate in tandem to counter terrorist attacks. Furthermore, the Ministry of Peace, which oversees the EFP and intelligence services, increased its public messaging, peace-building activities, and coordination role, to combat the influence of Al Shabaab and other terrorist groups. The National Intelligence and Security Service collect intelligence to detect and disrupt terrorism in support of EFP and Attorney General's efforts to conduct law enforcement investigations and prosecutions.

However, Ethiopia's security apparatus has been preoccupied by other security matters. The war in northern Ethiopia means that less attention and energy is employed to address external terrorist threats. In addition, the country's dire socio-economic and political situation could act as an incentive for youth recruitment by terrorist organizations. Another driver is youth unemployment. Any lapse in counter-terrorism efforts or lax security and intelligence operations, due to the current war effort and economic decline, could undermine

Ethiopia's tremendous gains evidenced in the last two decades. Terrorist groups have been aggressively expanding and posing a serious threat to Ethiopia.

Kenya's specific responses to CT threats: Kenya through its National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) established the National Strategy to Counter Violent Extremism (NSCVE) to address the threat of terrorism in 2016. The strategy has since been cascaded to counties (through the County Action Plans programs) as well as correctional facilities. It is a holistic approach to address the root causes of radicalization and violent extremism, and is aimed at rehabilitation and eventual reintegration of former terrorists into the society.

Kenya has also established the Joint Counter Terrorism Analysis Center which has incorporated a multi agency approach to countering terrorism, terrorism financing and violent extremism.

Legislative framework

Kenya has enacted legislation to counter terrorism threats within the country as follows:

- Proceeds of Crime and Anti Money Laundering Act, 2013 (POCALMA). This Act has established two offices, namelythe Financial Reporting Center (FRC) and the Asset Recovery Agency (ARA), which have been instrumental in the forfeiture and freezing of assets related to terrorism, thereby curtailing their operations.
- Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2012 (POTA) – Section 40B has established the NCTC.

Prosecution mechanisms

The following have been established:

- Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI);
- Anti Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU); and
- Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ODPP).

Capacity building for Judges and Magistrates program

- The capacity building programme within the criminal justice system includes judges, magistrates, prosecutors, investigators and correctional services personnel.
- Civic programs for prisons (prisoners and prison officers).

Community based programs and initiatives

- community leaders, youth, law enforcement, religious leaders.

Security Law Amendment Act, 2014

- Gave birth to the Multi Agency Team (MAT) and Joint Investigation Team (JIT). This encompasses all security and government agencies.

Successful convictions of Counter Terrorism (CT) cases in court

- Garissa University attack, Westgate attack, Belle-vista attack, Cuban doctors kidnap, Parliament foiled threat and Iranian case among many others.

Constitution of Kenya 2010

- Established devolved units with 15% of government resources/funds allocated to counties to address inclusivity, governance and socio-economic empowerment.

Kenya counterterrorism institutions are trifurcated around three poles. The first consists of the Kenya Police Service (KPS) and its Paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU), the Directorate of Criminal Investigation (DCI) which includes the investigative Anti-Terrorism Police Unit (ATPU), the Bomb Disposal Unit (BDU), the Cyber Forensics Investigative Unit (CFIU), the Administrative Police Service (APS) and it's Rural Border Patrol Unit (RBPU). The second consists of the National Intelligence Service (NIS). The third is made up of the Kenya Defense Forces (KDF).

In 2012, South Sudan enacted an Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Act (Act No.29). The act included clauses calling for the establishment of measures and institutions responsible for preventing and controlling money laundering and the financing of terrorism in South Sudan. Passing Anti Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism legislation, enacting a Counterterrorism Law and establishing a Counterterrorism Commission, is mandatory. The Joint Counter Terrorism Commission (JCTC)is a multi-agency cell established in August 2019 under the Counter Terrorism Unit (CTU) of the General Intelligence Bureau (GIB) of National Security (NSS) to bridge the gap of information sharing between various

intelligence and security agencies of South Sudan, as a joint effort in fighting global terrorism. The center is going to connected soon with the Interpol system for purposes of verification and screening of foreign fighters.

Composition of the Centre

- General Intelligence Bureau (GIB) National Security Service.
- Internal Security Bureau (ISB) National Security Bureau.
- South Sudan People's Defence Force (SSPDF) Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI)
- South Sudan National Police Services /Department of CID/Immigration/Interpol
- South Sudan Revenue Authority
- South Sudan Civil Aviation
- Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions / General Minister of the Justices and Constitution
- National Prison Services
- Financial Intelligence Unit (IU) /Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning

In 2001, Sudan enacted the Anti-Terrorism Act. Article 6 of this Act states that "Anyone who organizes, coerces or intends or participates or facilitates verbally or by an act, to administrate, organize, plan, network, to commit terrorist crimes, shall be punished by the death penalty.[68] Sudan's institutional framework for preventing money laundering and controlling and preventing terrorist financing in the country, is comprised of the Bank of Sudan (BOS), what is known as the Administrative Committee, the Minister of Finance, and the 1373 Committee. Their powers and responsibilities are derived from the Anti-Money Laundering Regulations (2002), the Money Laundering (Combating) Act 2003, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. Both the Administrative Committee and the 1373 Committee are high-level inter-agency bodies that aim at coordinating efforts amongst the various authorities involved. While the 1373 Committee has a good liaison with operational

[68] Sudan Anti-Terrorism Act 2001.

staff, the Administrative Committee remains too remote from the operational base in order to make an AML/CFT system effective.[69]

In 2014, Sudan established the Sudan National Commission for Counter-Terrorism (SNCCT) to lure the United States into removing the sanctions against it and its designation as a state sponsoring terrorism. It would have been odd for Sudan to have policies and institutions to deal with counter-terrorism before the ouster of the defunct Islamist regime of Omar El Bashir, when it was on the list of countries sponsoring terrorism. However, SNCCT was oriented towards curbing the emergence of radicalized violent Sudanese youth who mostly hailed from poor and marginalized ethnic groups.[70]

For example, in 2016, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Sudan and the SNCCT, agreed to strengthen the stability and resilience of citizens who could potentially be radicalized and mobilized to join violent extremists' groups, including at-risk urban and rural youth. To understand the drivers of radicalization towards violent extremism in Sudan, the UNDP, in partnership with the SNCCT and some civil society actors, set precedence by undertaking an evidence-based and gender-inclusive study on the trends of violent extremism in Sudan in the 2016-17 period. In total, 380 key people were interviewed, including former members of the Islamic State and former Guantanamo Bay prisoners, their families, community members and leaders.

Since 2019, the Sudan Transitional Government has pledged to develop a national strategy for countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment. However, that strategy and the supposedly national action plan to implement it, are far from being realized.

[69] World Bank 2005.
[70] UNDP 2019

Sudan's existing process combines government and civil society resources and uses a social, economic, and religious approach toward strengthening its population against internal or external "extremist" influences. Sudan's de-radicalization programs run concurrently with the national strategy. De-radicalization programs in Sudan are focused on reintegrating and rehabilitating returned foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) and those espousing terrorist ideologies. It repatriated a small number of women and children who were affiliated with FTFs (mostly the spouses and children of ISIS members killed in Libya) and enrolled them in Sudanese rehabilitation programs.

In Uganda, some important institutions have been established to fight against or eradicate terrorism in the country and region. The Uganda Police Force (UPF), with the help of other departments like Interpol Uganda, play a major role in responding to and investigating terrorist attacks (United States Department of State, 2017).

Secondly, the United Nations has sponsored international bodies like IGAD through capacity building programmes. Uganda has adopted massive training programmes on terrorism, with help from international organizations operating within the country. Some officers in the anti-terrorism department were trained under the IGAD Security Sector Programme (ISSP), funded by the UN office of drugs and crime in Entebbe (2019) and Nairobi. Information on terrorism and intelligence sharing was disseminated, and they were taught how shared information from the army could be used as evidence. For example, if the army has radio intercepts, how these could be used as evidence and how the court admits that illegally obtained evidence tapping can be submitted to the court.

Uganda is a member of the international and regional cooperations, and has a center for counter terrorism in place. Through the counterterrorism centre of excellence, there is a lot of information sharing between Nairobi and Kampala (East African counterterrorism), and this has served to divert two planned attacks on Kampala. The counterterrorism centre of excellence has enabled the country to be alert and act immediately whenever there are

suspicious movements in Nairobi and Kampala that link to terror attacks or claims on the state (KII,2021). As a member state of the African Union, Uganda remains the key partner in the African Union Mission In Somalia (AMISON) to neutralize Al-Shabaab in the region (United States Department of State, 2017).

The Ugandan government, in 2017, approved an Anti-terrorism (Amendment) Act whose major objective was to explain the true definition of the term "terrorism" and "act of terrorism" to include the international aspects envisaged by the United Nations Convention Against Terrorism (UN, 2018). This act was further amended in 2020 to address terrorism and activities in line with it. The Bill also ensures the protection of citizens' civil and political rights. In response to the threat of terrorism, Uganda has adopted national, regional and international mechanisms intended to detect, prevent, disrupt, deter, deny and neutralize the activities of the terror groups. These initiatives include the following:

National level: Legislation

- Enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 2002, (with amendments) which establishes the legal framework within which the counterterrorism effort is regulated.
- Enactment of the Amnesty Act, 2000, which has motivated a number of terrorists, especially from ADF and LRA, to surrender and be reintegrated into society.
- Enactment of Anti-Money Laundering Act 2013 and the establishment of a Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA).
- Enactment of the Lawful Interception of Communications Act, 2010.
- Establishment of the War Crimes Division at the High Court, that handles cases of genocide and terrorism.

Other National Efforts include:

- Enhancing target-hardening measures on vital national infrastructure/installations, such as hydroelectric dams, airports, Parliament, State House, hotels, places of worship, transport terminals, among others.
- Building capacity through acquisition of specialized equipment and training/rehearsals.
- Enhanced intelligence sharing and inter-agency cooperation. For instance, conducting counter-terrorism joint operations under security arrangements such as Joint anti-Terrorism Taskforce (JATT) and Joint Operations Committee (JOC).
- Effecting deployments on key establishments (foundation security, domination of venues of major events and foot and motorized patrols).
- Carrying out regular surveys and inspections of vital installations and establishments for purposes of upgrading security measures.
- Community Policing through mobilization and public awareness campaigns against terrorism.
- Enhancing safeguards during transportation and storage of hazardous materials, which may be used by terrorists in attacks.
- Heightening border controls and immigration through the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES), passports and liaison.
- Counter-radicalization Programme (empowering vulnerable communities to increase their resilience against radical and extremist ideologies).
- Economic empowerment of vulnerable groups to deny terrorists potential recruits through programmes such as the Youth Livelihood Fund and the Parish Development Model (PDM).

Regional Level: Uganda has adopted and is implementing the following international protocols or mechanisms on countering terrorism:

- The East Africa Fusion and Liaison Unit in Entebbe.
- The Eastern Africa Standby Force (Nairobi).

- The AU Convention for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism (1999).
- Joint UPDF/FARDC (Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo) Operation Shujaa against the ADF in Eastern DRC.
- East African Community Counter-Terrorism Mechanisms, which include sharing of information and coordination on terror and related activities by police under Eastern Africa Police Chiefs Cooperation Organization (EAPCCO), Defence/Armies under Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Centre (RDCTC) and five Intelligence/Security Organizations under Chiefs of East African Intelligence and Security Forum.
- The Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Plan of Action for Prevention and Combating Terrorism, adopted in Kampala-Uganda in October 2003.
- The IGAD Peace and Security Strategy, Regional Defence Counter Terrorism Centre in Nairobi,
- The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Algiers, Algeria (1999) and the 2004 Protocol to the OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.
- The AU Plan of Action for the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism, Algiers, Algeria 2002.
- AU-led regional initiatives such as AMISOM-led joint Operations Coordination Centre and the Regional Cooperation Initiative for the Elimination of the Lord's Resistance Army (RCI-LRA).

International Level: Uganda continues to support and implement the following relevant UN resolutions, Conventions, instruments and international agreements on combating/elimination of terrorism:

- The UN plan of action to Prevent Violent Extremism (2015).
- UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2006).
- United Nations Security Council Resolution (1373), (2002) on Counter-Terrorism Measures.

- The 1999 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
- International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, (2005).

The Uganda Police Force (UPF) is the lead legal instrument for neutralizing terrorist acts in the country and they arrest, respond to and investigate terrorist attacks on the nation. The major response by the police department in the country against terrorism has been the deployment of security personnel at the border points and transit areas for terrorism recruits. The state has also deployed many soldiers in disguise at Kisenyi and Namayiba bus terminals, which were actively used as transit areas for the ADF recruits from eastern Uganda to western Uganda and then into Congo. Many of the nation's army personnel have been deployed in areas bordering Uganda and Congo (western and northern regions) and this has suppressed terrorism activities. It is now very difficult for the rebel groups to transit recruits from Uganda into Congo since most of their tactics have been made known and stopped by the army.

Uganda also enacted the Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act to address deficiencies in the principal Act and conducted a money laundering and terrorism finance natural risk assessment and established an anti-money launders terrorist finance national Task Force (United States of Department of State, 2017). This has greatly affected the transaction of funds that used to come through different banks and money entities to fund terrorism activities. For example, ADF's former leader, Jamil Mukulu's accounts were frozen by the government of Uganda, which greatly affected the operations of this terrorist group due to the cut off of financial transactions from foreign assistance. It is fair to state that the Anti-Money Laundering (Amendment) Act has negatively affected terrorism activities in the country.

5. Terrorist organizations' regional and global networks

5.1 Al Shabaab

Al Shabaab networks are activate and deploy auxiliaries of three kinds. The first category act as incubation nurseries for nurturing and hardening future recruits through urban criminal activities. The second category is made up of elements that return to eliminate those deemed to have betrayed the cause and neutralize government agents, local administrators, religious leaders, and elders, as a prelude to crippling the administration of the state. Their broad objective is to instill fear in the populace. The third are lone wolves.

5.2 Da'esh

After its defeat in Iraq and Syria, Da'esh membership was estimated at more than 20,000 scattered all over the World. Some of these fighters were split between Syria and Iraq, while a small core was integrated into sympathetic rural and urban communities. Most Da'esh-affiliated fighters are in Afghanistan, South-East Asia, West Africa, Libya, Egypt/Sinai, Yemen, Somalia and the Sahel.

By 2010, it had become clear that Al Shabaab networks were interconnected. The Muslim Youth Center (which eventually transformed into Al-Hijra) was core in providing logistical support to Al Shabaab and the ADF of Uganda. It was able to raise bail for Jamil Mukulu, the Mukulu leader's son, when Jamil was arrested in Nairobi. The Kenyan elements in the Saleh Ali Saleh Labhan brigade and ADF enablers, carried out the Kampala bomb attacks in 2010 that killed 74 and injured 85. Al Shabaab has also helped provide training to ADF, both in Somalia and in DRC.[71]

[71] See Enough Project Jan 29, 2014

5.3. Networking with other Terrorist Organizations in Africa

Transnational terrorist organizations in the IGAD region have built alliances and collaborative arrangements with Middle Eastern groups such as Hamas, Hizbollah and Iran. The history of Middle Eastern groups designated as terrorists, in Sudan, is ultimately linked with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As early as 1991, Sudan supported the Popular Islamic Arab Conference and lent material and ideological support to these organizations. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard, also designated as a terrorist organization, support Hamas and Sudan for finance transfers and smuggling arms to Gaza in Palestine, using the Red Sea, Port Sudan and the harsh desert terrain.

The Egyptian crackdown and closing of arms smuggling tunnels did not reduce arms smuggling into the Gaza Strip significantly, on account of various difficulties, such as the length of the border with Sudan (over 1200 km), problematic control of the border with Rafah, and the country's permeability through hundreds of tunnels, some in densely populated areas. However, the smuggling of arms from Iran destined for the Gaza Strip, continues. The Israeli response has hindered arms smuggling, and has included launching pre-emptive strikes against the nearest source, Sudan. "Sudan constitutes a central crossroads in this smuggling route, where the weapons got in various manners from Iran are transferred to the Gaza Strip through the Sinai Peninsula. Before the weapons are introduced into the Gaza Strip, the last station is the Sinai, which harbors local infrastructures of smugglers, mostly Sinai-based Bedouins, to whom smuggling serves as a major subsistence. These groups deal with arms procurement and their transfer over the Sudan-Egypt border to the Gaza Strip.

For example, in 2012, the American news network, ABC, reported that Israel had carried out three airstrikes since January 2012, against what was believed to be Iranian arms shipments passing through Sudan on their way to Gaza. Sudanese officials confirmed that in January 2012, in the wake of Israel's assault on Hamas-ruled Gaza, unidentified aircraft attacked a

convoy of 17 trucks heading north through eastern Sudan. The Israel Air Force was apparently behind the attack. According to the report, 39 people riding in the convoy were killed, while many civilians in the area were injured. The Lebanese militant group Hezbollah denounced the alleged airstrikes.

Figure 5.1: Major Da'esh Networks within and outside IGAD Member States



To supply Hamas with such material, Iran developed various smuggling routes. In some cases, Sinai-based Bedouin smugglers brought items to Gaza via Sudan, with the approval of Islamist president, Omar al-Bashir. Yet Bashir expelled Iranian officials from Sudan in 2014, mainly in the hope of staving off economic collapse by winning financial aid from Tehran's regional arch-rival, Saudi Arabia. Iran and Hezbollah have also smuggled weapons and rockets along these routes.

Under the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood regime of Mohamed Morsi, the country served as a hub of Hamas finance. But since the ouster of Morsi by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, the regime in Egypt has delivered a blow to Hamas' finances by shutting down some 1,700 smuggling tunnels. This situation has deprived Hamas of the opportunity to tax its people on smuggled goods and has burdened the group's ability to transfer cash to its coffers. With Egypt now under control, four other jurisdictions contribute to Hamas' estimated $1 billion annual budget, and those countries are Qatar, Turkey, Iran, and Sudan.

Meanwhile, Sudan plays a significant role in smuggling large rockets to Hamas; this did not recieve much attention until 2012. Iran shipped rockets by sea, and they often arrived in Port Sudan, and were smuggled up through Egypt and across the Sinai Peninsula. Sudan has also stored Iranian rockets for Hamas. Notably, Israel bombed the Khartoum warehouse full of Fajr 5 rockets in October 2012.

In 2019, Sudan closed the offices of Hamas and Hezbollah as part of its efforts to rebuild relations with the US and get sanctions lifted. The seizure of Hammas' mobiles and mobile assets, was possible thanks to attempts by Sudan's transitional government. However, the Palestinian Authority urged Sudan's government to hand over assets it seized as part of a crackdown targeting Sudan-based operations, in order to fund the Palestinian militant group, Hamas. Hamas denied having links to companies and individuals targeted by Sudan's

crackdown, claiming that the seized assets belonged to Palestinian investors and businesses.[72] However, Sudan considers the seized businesses and investments to be front organizations managed by Palestinians on behalf of Hamas.

Before he escaped to Somalia, Ahmad Imaan Ali had, together with Aboud Rogo, helped to find, support, and recruit Al hijra cells in Tanzania, Uganda, DRC, Burundi, and Mozambique.[73] They helped send these recruits for training in Somalia. Imaan's objective was the realization of the broader caliphate, through the destabilization of Kenya. Though older than the Muslim Youth Centre in Tanzanian, Anzaar Muslim Youth Centre (AMYC) was highly influenced and radicalized by Aboud Rogo. Rogo is a radical Kenyan imam who was sanctioned by the United Nations for his support of Al-Shabaab. Moreover, he broadcasts his speeches in Swahili, which has allowed disaffected youth in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique - many of whom speak Swahili but have a weak or no understanding of Arabic - to access extremist viewpoints, accelerating their radicalization (Campbell 2021).

Before 1988, the Tanzanian Anzaar Muslim Youth Centre was known as the Tanzanian Muslim Youth Union (UVIKITA). Its objectives were moral reform by promoting a Salafist doctrine.[74] From its operational base in Tanga, AMYC raised funds for recruitment and radicalization in support of Al Shabaab. It was able to sustain its operations with the help of criminal networks.[75] Its members were sent to Aboud Rogo's indoctrination programmes in Kanamai and Masjid Musa. It is here that their convergence with Muslim Youth Centre elements like

[72] Nidal Al-mughrabi, 2021.
[73] Notes from Interview Briefs with Intelligence Sources in the GLR. See also Nyambura Gisela. How Elite Unit Killed Kenya's Most Wanted Terror Kingpin. The Standard, Thursday 14, October 2021 p6-7
[74] See United Nations Security Council, Letter dated 11July 2012, from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to resolution 751 (192 and1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, addressed to the President of Security Council, pp177
[75] Ibid

Shiekh Ahmed Imaan Ali, comes in. Others headed to Bongwe in Kwale's Madrasatul Tawheed Islamiya, the base of Ramadhan Kifungwa of Jaysh Ayman.[76]

It is worth noting that Shiekh Ahmed Imaan Ali is the leader of Al-Hijra, also known as the Muslim Youth Center (MYC). The group is affiliated with Al Shabaab. He is known for radicalizing Tanzanian and Kenyan youth before sending them to Somalia or Mozambique (TRAC 2021 and Chome 2020).

Maximizing on drug and smuggling networks in Tanga, AMYC could traverse its followers across Tanzanian and the Kenyan Coast, into Kismayu.[77] Rogo's Madrasas also helped incubate elements from Mozambique, Rwanda and Burundi.[78] Many found their way into Somalia. Many of the cells were identified to be located in Arusha, Mwanza, Mtwara and Dar Es Salaam.[79]

Kibiti district in Tanzania was at the core of many Tanzanians who drifted into Al Shabaab. From 2014, they affected several attacks and assassinations of police agents and local government officers. Exploiting the Amboni caves, they began effecting bank robberies. These activities continued into 2017, when the government responded with crackdowns. In 2017, many Islamists headed into the DRC to join the rebranded Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), which boosted recruits from Uganda and Tanzania. ADF's initial objective was to take over Uganda's state and establish an Islamic State. In 2015, its leader, Sunday Mukulu, was

[76] See Nyambega Gisesa and Vincent Achuka. The Kwale Hamlet Where Dreaded Terror Squad Commanders Were Raised, Daily Nation, 20 August 2020, p10-11

[77] See Ngala Chome. Eastern Africa's Regional Extremist Threat: Origins, Nature and Policy Options. CRIPS. Research paper, September 2020, p14

[78] See Musambayi Katumanga: Kenya: Unconsolidated Geographies of Exclusion, Termite Movements and State Viability Question. IDS, University of Nairobi. Program on Social Movements. Unpublished paper. 2014 p. See also Adrian, Fray, "Armed Men Attack Police Stations in Mocimboa da priaia. Club of Mozambique, 5 October 2017.

[79] See also; Al Shabaab as a Transnational Security Threat. IGAD Security Sector Program (ISSP) and Sahan Foundation March 2016, p35

arrested in Tanzania. Violence in Tanzania at Ikwiriri and Kibiti, dismantled the nascent *Foco* that had embedded itself with scores of killings. This forced adherents from Tanzanian and Mozambique, where they joined an existing Foco.[80] Others moved into DRC in mid-2017.[81] By 2020, this *Foco* had matured into a full-fledged insurgency named Al Sunnah Wal Jamaa (Al Shabaab). Elements from these groups established links with ADF and ISIS. They also retain links with Tanzanian elements in Somalia.[82]

While Al Shabaab has remained active, ISIS has generally conducted low-key attacks in Somalia. This situation is not the case in Eastern Congo and Mozambique. It is evolving to transform Somalia into the base and coordinating point for its Eastern, Da'esh Central and Southern Africa operations. Many East African groups are shifting to Eastern Congo and Mozambique's Capo Del Gado, but they provide trainers, tactical strategists, and financial support.[83] Notably, Islamic State in the Central Africa province has been demonstrating increased operational capacity in DRC and Mozambique. Between January 2021 and March 2021, 200 people were killed and 40,000 displaced by ADF and ISCAP.[84] ISCAP, the more lethal group, has strived to capture more territory in North Kivu and Ituri. These actions have been animated by the decisions of Rwanda and Kenya to deploy in Mozambique and Congo, respectively.[85] Uganda, too is in discussions with DRC over the same. In effect, we can talk of expanding geographies of contestation. It can also be surmised that ISIS's interests in DRC are driven more by the desire to gain control of the potential vast resources it can extract and

[80] See Musambayi Katumanga: Kenya: Unconsolidated Geographies of Exclusion, Termite Movements and State Viability Question. IDS, University of Nairobi. Program on Social Movements. Unpublished paper. 2014 p. See also Adrian, Fray, "Armed Men Attack Police Stations in Mocimboa da priaia. Club of Mozambique, 5 October 2017.

[81] Mugeci et al. 2021.

[82] See The Global Strategy Network. Islamic State in East Africa European Institute of Peace. 2018, p40

[83] United Nations Security Council. Letter Dated 21 January 2021, from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999),1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Daesh, Al Qaeda and Associated individuals, groups undertakings and entities) addressed to the President of the Security Council. 3 February 2021.

[84] See Africa New and AFP 19/3/2021

[85] Andrew Wasike: Kenya Deploys Troops to Troubled Democratic Republic of Congo. World Africa 10/8/2021:

use to fund its operations. It is also banking on insecurity dilemmas to polarize inter- and intra-state relations in its favour.

Initially, Jahba East Africa, an affiliate of Al Shabaab, whose roots lay in earlier efforts of Aboud Rogo and Imaan Ali[86], and which set up cells across East Africa, switched sides and announced itself as an affiliate of Da'esh with operatives in Somalia, Tanzania, and Uganda.[87] In addition to these, are cells manned by elements from Tanzania, DRC, Rwanda and Mozambique. It draws its inspiration from the Teachings of Abu Zinira (Iman Ali). Abubakr Abdi, one of the commanders in the Jayshi Ayman Jabhats, defected to ISIS with 21 fighters, in January 2021.

Da'esh ideology in sub-Saharan Africa has been quietly growing, not simply because of its well-known merger with Boko Haram. Indeed, three new Islamic State affiliates have gained prominence in sub-Saharan Africa over the past year-plus. In West Africa, the group known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), has gained prominence with a string of deadly attacks in September and October 2016.

Islamic State in Central Africa (ISCA)-ADF is an Islamic State affiliate based in north-eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Many Congolese and Ugandans call the group by its original name, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). Ugandan Salafi-Tabliq Muslims and a Ugandan rebel group founded ADF in 1995. It based its operations in north-eastern DRC. The group still draws mainly Congolese and Ugandan members but has become more integrated with transnational Salafi-jihadi networks, since a new leader took control in 2015. The ADF established connections with the Islamic State in 2016 and became part of the Islamic State's Central Africa Province in 2019.

[86] Mugeci et al. 2021.
[87] See Ty McCormick. Foreign Policy, Foiled Kenya Anthrax Plot Hints at Islamic State's Scramble for Africa. May 4, 2016.

In conclusion, this sub-section illustrates that Da'esh networks are globally linked to Afghanistan, South-East Asia, West Africa, Libya, Egypt/Sinai, Yemen, Somalia and the Sahel. The IGAD region has a prominent presence in Somalia, linking it up with Mozambique and the Central African Republic. The field study to Sudan has shed light on whether some individuals are fighting alongside Da'esh, similar to their involvement in Libya as alluded to earlier.

5.4 Trends and Vulnerability Factors

5.4.1 Trends

The Global Terrorist Index (GTI) shows that the IGAD region performed worse that the African continental average and that Somalia ranks fifth in the world as the country with the highest number of terrorist incidences and casualties while Djibouti is the least affected, ranking 130. However, the overall trend in the IGAD region is positive, showing that the incidences of terrorism were in decline in the 2018-2019 period, compared with 2002-2019 period. The African average improved in 2018-2019 period to 1.056, compared with the IGAD region, 1.247. The exodus of a large number of Al Qaeda and later Da'esh fighters to North Africa and the African Sahel, augmented the establishment of Boko Haram in 2002 (Table 5.1, below).

Table 5.1: IGAD Member States GTI Ranks and Scores, 2020

Rank	Country	2020 GTI score (out of 10)	Change 2002-2019	Change 2018-2019
5	Somalia	7.645	4.572	-0.157
22	South Sudan	5.726	5.726	-0.613
23	Kenya	5.644	1.011	-0.100
28	Ethiopia	5.307	3.927	-0.039
55	Uganda	3.278	-2.391	-0.704
130	Djibouti	0.038	0.038	-0.282
IGAD Average			1.247	-0.315
Africa Average			1.056	-0.035

Source: Global Terrorist Index (2021), Available at https://visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/11/GTI-2020-web-1.pdf [accessed 20 December 2021]

Four main trends characterize the development of international terrorist networks in the IGAD region, which are linked to and influenced by the current regional and international terrorist networks:

a) **Increased autonomy in decision making:** There is increasing country and cross-country cooperation between the IGAD region's terrorist groups. For example, the study has illustrated that Da'esh Somali Province cooperates and coordinates its activities within Somalia, between its Puntland and Mogadishu branches. Likewise, it coordinates Da'esh operations and attacks with the Islamic State of Central Africa, based in the DRC. Al Shabaab offers training and logistic support to Sudan, and Mozambique. Meanwhile, the ADF, an affiliate of Da'esh, has created a network of Uganda-based radical Islamist groups which have blended with Da'esh as part of the network.

b) **Simultaneous increase of localization and globalization of terrorist networks**: Terrorist networks are becoming increasing localized. Most evident, is the recruiting of fighters from within the African continent, and being less readily available to accept foreign fighters and leadership from the Middle East and North Africa. A case in point is Al Shabaab's purging of foreign fighters in 2012-2013 period, which is narrated earlier in this Study.

c) **Increasing decentralization**: Da'esh–Somalia echoes that of many of Da'esh provinces throughout the continent. In Somalia - an unstable, poor state with a substantial al-Qaeda presence - the Islamic State's global emergence decentralized Jihad, allowing ambitious but disaffected Jihadi ideologues, such as Abdulqadir Mumin, to break away from his al-Qaeda cell in Puntland and, with members of his Ali Saleeban sub-clan, attempt to form an Da'esh–Somalia branch. For Mumin, achieving affiliate utility validation proved difficult: it would take nearly thirty-four months - nearly three years - from the time of his pledge for his group to be consistently referred to as an IS wilaya. And, even once it became an official wilaya of the Islamic State, evidence suggests that it received little more than occasional direction or assistance from IS Central. Instead, as with other IS cells, Da'–Somalia is a sovereign subordinate of IS Central, conducting its own day-to-day

operations (including expanding southward, targeting members of the Somali government, and fighting with Al-Shabaab) with limited demonstrable interaction with the parent body beyond appearances in its media.[88]

d) **Perfecting cyber-Jihad**: Cyber terror is a common trend which has taken root in all terrorist organizations, along with the penetration of ICT and different social media platforms. Young people are lured to radicalism because of the slim chances of getting a job - which they attribute to the failure of the development models of the post-colonial elites and ensuing socio-economic and identity crises within society. The frustration produced by these developments often leads not only to attempts to flee to Europe or escape in drug consumption or petty crime, but also a turn to extremist religious positions. Western interventions and what are felt to be one-sided Western positions in conflicts such as Palestine, have further boosted this tendency. Da'esh is an active user of blogs, instant messaging, video sharing sites, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, Tumblr, and Ask FM. Their media campaign underscores that terror can be streamed and sold with graphic images, audio messages, and music.[89] This new trend has created highly decentralized national, regional, and globally linked terrorist networks, with different degrees of autonomy from the Centre.[90] For instance, Al Qaeda has gone virtual, with affiliates, such as Al Shabaab, that are financially, logistically, and technically autonomous from the centre. Similarly, Da'esh Provinces enjoy greater freedom to prepare and execute attacks or expand their activities to new countries. In IGAD Member States where advance knowledge of countering cyber-Jihad is barely adequate, it is too difficult, almost impossible, to control the flow of information from multiple highly encrypted outlets intended for pre-identified users.

[88] Warner 2021: 261.

[89] Liang 2015 and Ginkel

[90] Warner 2021, and Karr 2021.

5.4.2 Vulnerabilities

There are at least two types of vulnerabilities which make IGAD member States susceptible to terrorists' presence and potential security threats. The first threat emanates from the various levels of awareness and preparedness of IGAD Member States to the international terrorist networks' current trends. The second is associated with the lack of collective action plans to counter international terrorist networks in existence in the IGAD Member States.

In the first instance: the increased autonomy of terrorist networks in decision making, makes it very difficult for national intelligence and security agencies to intercept their movements, communication, and information on planned attacks. The difficulty arises from the terrorist's ability to integrate fully into the rural and urban local communities, using 'sticks and carrots' to marshal support and loyalty, suppress opponents and prosecute informants, such as in the case of Somalia. The local/global nexus enables the terrorists to exploit not only local grievances, but also grievances originating from the perception that the Western-dominated world is anti-Muslim and therefore, its interests and way of life must be eliminated. There is also the paradoxical situation in which a global/local nexus predominate, leads to decentralization, where poorly equipped security and intelligence organs will be overstretched fighting multiple and dispersed terror networks and their corresponding regional and global networks and support systems.

In the second instance, there are vulnerabilities emanating from the IGAD Member States individually and as a collective. These vulnerabilities are linked to the drivers of terrorism, namely the lack of socio-economic opportunities; marginalization and discrimination; governance deficits, human rights abuses, and disrespect for the rule of law; prolonged and unresolved conflicts; and radicalization in prisons. These vulnerabilities are depicted in the introduction of this study. There are also factors which motivate individuals to transform their reality, confront grievances and perceptions of suppression or foreign intervention, or a feeling of ideological or religious domination.

The porous borders of IGAD Member States enable terrorist groups to avoid border control posts and move from country to country within the region and across the Red Sea to Saudi Arabia and Yemen (see the section on terrorist networks). Terrorists use front businesses and individuals embedded in the local communities for money laundering, and localized money transfer systems based on trust such as Hawala, which are difficult to detect.

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IGAD Security Sector Program (IGAD SSP) of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) was established pursuant to the regional peace and security strategy to address the Emerging, Evolving and Existing Transnational Security Threats (EEE-TSTs).

The overall objective of IGAD SSP is to promote and strengthen regional and national capacities to better predict, prevent and counter TSTs and thereby contribute to regional peace and stability in the IGAD region.

IGAD SSP strives to enhance and enable member states' security sector capacities to address common threats, thus, engendering sustainable economic development. It has the following three Strategic Priority areas:

- Strengthening regional cooperation and coordination;
- Enhance member states' and IGAD's institutional and human capacities; and
- Promote and support the signing, ratification and domestication of relevant regional and international instruments

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